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ABSTRACT

As the Internet has increased the ease and amount of interstate
transactions,the states have struggled to require "remote vendors "-vendors
without a physical presence in the taxing state-to collect or pay taxes. The
states are attempting to overcome these struggles by lowering Commerce

Clause limitations on theirjurisdictionto tax, but meaningful limitations on
suchjurisdictionimposed by the Due Process Clauseawait the states. The Due
Process Clause requires that state actions be fundamentallyfair, and to meet
this standarda state must provide a person with a benefit and the person must
indicate acceptance of that benefit before the state can require the person to
collect or pay taxes. These requirements limit the states'jurisdictionto tax
certain remote vendors; thus, the states must take the Due Process Clause

seriously ifthey wish to fully solve their remote vendor issues.
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"One of the best things about buying through Wayfair is that we do not have
to charge sales tax, with a few notable exceptions. . . ."I
I. INTRODUCTION
Only the most extreme Luddite is likely to be unaware that sales taxes
are absent on many online purchases like those made from Wayfair, but many
consumers may not have considered why this absence is-or should be-so.
Many more consumers may be unaware that when they do not pay sales taxes
on their online purchases they may owe use taxes to their home state instead. 2
1.
Ordering Information, WAYFAIR LLC, http://www.wayfair.com/
customerservice/orderinginfo.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). Those "notable
exceptions" cover "orders shipping to Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, Utah,
California, and all Canadian provinces ... (however, in Massachusetts, sales tax does
not apply to purchases of gun safes and shoes)." Id.
2.
A use tax is a complementary tax to a sales tax. RICHARD D. POMP,
STATE & LOcAL TAXATION 6-39 (8th ed. 2015) (describing the role of use taxes). If
sales tax does not apply to a consumer's purchase at the time of sale-as might occur
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According to a recent study, the lack of sales taxes and nonpayment of use
taxes on online purchases resulted in the non-collection of $11.4 billion in
sales and use tax revenues in 2012.3 Not surprisingly, the states would like to
close this sales and use tax gap, primarily by requiring "remote vendors"vendors with no physical presence in the taxing state, like Wayfair in many
states-to collect and remit use taxes owed by their residents on goods sold by
the remote vendors.4 Not only that, many states would also like to subject

when a good is purchased over the Internet, then the consumer is typically legally
obligated to pay a use tax when she first uses the purchased property in the state. Id.
Compliance with such use tax obligations is dismal. See authorities cited infra note
123.
3. See Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local
Sales Tax Revenue Losses from E-Commerce, 52 ST. TAx NOTES 537 (May 18, 2009)
[hereinafter Bruce et al., Losses]. The uncollected amount represented 3.8% of total

sales tax liabilities for 2012. Projected revenue loses for individual states can be found
in Table 5 of the study. The researchers expect that such revenue losses "will likely
continue to grow rapidly, at least for the next several years." Donald Bruce, William
F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, E-tailer Sales Tax Nexus and State Tax Policies, 68 NAT'L
TAX J. 735, 736 (2015) [hereinafter Bruce et al., E-tailer]. However, some have
questioned the accuracy of this estimate. See Noah Aldonas, DOR Disputes ECommerce Sales Tax Loss Estimates, 65 ST. TAx NOTES 576 (Aug. 21, 2012); Billy
Hamilton, Fox andFriends: The Rest ofthe Story on E-Commerce Tax Loss Estimates,
68 ST. TAx NOTES 535 (May 13, 2013); Joseph Henchman, The Marketplace Fairness
Act: A Primer (Tax Found. Background Paper No. 69, 2014), http://www.tax
foundation.org/article/marketplace-fairness-act-primer. Sales and use taxes made up a
substantial portion-31.3% in 2014-of total state tax revenues, second only to
property taxes. 2014 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2015), https://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/historical-data_2014

.html.
4.
Under Supreme Court precedent, a state cannot apply a sales tax to a
sale made outside of the state. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944)
(considering whether Arkansas could impose sales tax on property sold to an Arkansas
resident in Tennessee and observing that "[w]e would have to destroy both business
and legal notions to deny that under these circumstances the sale-the transfer of
ownership-was made in Tennessee. For Arkansas to impose a tax on such transaction
would be to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate
transaction."). However, the state can apply a use tax to property sold outside of the
state but used in the state. See Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335,
338 (1944).
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remote vendors to income tax' based on their sales to the states' residents.
Unfortunately for the states' aspirations, the U.S. Constitution-as interpreted
by the Supreme Court-stands in their way.
Many commentators argue that the states could overcome their
constitutional hurdles if only Congress or the Supreme Court would remove
certain Commerce Clause limitations on the states' jurisdiction to tax.' This
argument is undoubtedly correct in the case of many remote vendors but, by

5.
"Income tax" is used in this Article as an umbrella term covering direct
taxes on a business's income.
6.
See, e.g., Christina R. Edson, Quill's ConstitutionalJurisprudenceand

&

Tax Nexus Standardsin an Age ofElectronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 897-905
(1996); Michael T. Fatale, The Evolution ofDue Process and State Tax Jurisdiction,
55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 565 (2015); Megan E. Groves, Tolling the Information
Superhighway: State Sales and Use Taxation ofElectronic Commerce, 13 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 619, 624-28 (2000); Rick Handel, A ConceptualAnalysis ofNexus in State
and Local Taxation, 67 TAx LAW. 623, 631-44 (2014); Paul J. Hartman, Collection
of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39 VAND. L. REV. 993, 1009-11
(1986); Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate over State Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 13 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 549, 563-65 (2000) [hereinafter
Hellerstein, Deconstructing]; Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic
Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 425, 450-56 (1997) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Electronic
Commerce]; Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role of the Dormant Commerce
Clause in State Tax Jurisdiction,24 VA. TAX REV. 109, 120-21 (2005); Catherine V.
Lane, National Bellas Hess, Inc.: Obsolescent Precedent or Good Law After Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1183, 1199-1217 (1992); Sandra
B. McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due Process Considerations, 1985 BYU L.
REV. 265 (1985); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce:
Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269,
323-25 (1997); Paull Mines, Commentary: Conversing With Professor Hellerstein:
Electronic Commerce and Nexus PropelSales and Use Tax Reform, 52 TAX L. REV.
581, 613-16 (1997); John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An
Economic Nexus Standardfor the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 356-57
(2004); Natasha Varyani, Taxing Electronic Commerce: The Efforts of Sales and Use
Tax to Evolve with Technology, 39 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 151, 157-59 (2014); Anna
M. Hoti, Comment, Finishing What Quill Started: The TransactionalNexus Test for
State Use Tax Collection, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1449, 1453-61 (1996); Mary Benton
Clark Calhoun, Has the Due Process Clause Gotten Its Groove Back?, 64 ST. TAX
NoTEs 721 (Jun. 4, 2012); Paul H. Frankel, Craig B. Fields, & Richard C. Call, The
Due Process Clause as a Bar to State Tax Nexus, 66 ST. TAX NOTES 343 (Oct. 29,
2012); Stephanie Anne Lipinski Galland, Preliminary Thoughts on Nexus: Is There a
New Frontier?,40 ST. TAX NOTEs 859 (Jun. 12, 2006).
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failing to fully consider the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause'
on states' jurisdiction to tax, is wrong in the case of others.
When a state has the ability to require a person to collect or pay a tax,
the state has what is termed "enforcement jurisdiction" over the person.8
Understanding the requirements of the Due Process Clause for enforcement
jurisdiction is critical to understanding when a state may require a remote
vendor to collect and remit a use tax or pay an income tax. However, existing
analyses of enforcement jurisdiction tend to bypass one of the Due Process
Clause's requirements for such jurisdiction over a person-that a state give
the person something for which it can ask return 9 -in favor of focusing on the
person's activities directed towards the state or on administrative solutions to
the states' jurisdictional issues."o
This Article explores the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return
requirement and its relationship to other Due Process Clause requirements for
enforcement jurisdiction, arguing that a transactional theory of enforcement
jurisdiction underlies the due process jurisprudence in this area. This theory
requires both the state and the person it wishes to tax to do something before
the state has enforcement jurisdiction over the person-the state must provide
the person with some benefit" and the person has to direct gain-seeking
activities towards the state, thereby indicating acceptance of the state-provided
7.
"Due Process Clause" refers to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, unless otherwise noted.
8.
Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdictionto Tax Income and Consumption in the
New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REv. 1, 3
(2003); accordArthur R. Rosen & Marc D. Bernstein, State Taxation ofCorporations:
The Evolving Danger of Attributional Nexus, 41 TAX EXECUTIVE 533, 534 (1989)

("Viewing the Commerce and Due Process requirements together, two different nexus
requirements can be discerned. First, there must be adequate connection between the
state and the corporation upon which a tax or a tax collection requirement is being
imposed. This may be called the 'presence nexus' requirement because the focus is
whether the foreign corporation can, in some sense, be said to be present within the
taxing state. Second, there must be adequate connection between the state and the
transaction, income, or property being taxed. This may be called the 'transactional
nexus' requirement.").
9.
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
10. See authorities cited supra note 6. But see John A. Swain & Walter
Hellerstein, State Jurisdiction to Tax "Nowhere" Activity, 33 VA. TAX REv. 209
(2013).

11. This Article will use the term "benefit" generally to refer to benefits,
protections, services, etc., that a state might provide to a person.
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benefit. The transactional theory of enforcement jurisdiction in turn informs
the application of the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return requirement by
establishing how a state must provide that benefit. Due to the transactional
nature of enforcement jurisdiction, a state actor must provide the person with
the benefit supporting such jurisdiction over the person; a state cannot exercise
enforcement jurisdiction over a person who has only been affected by a benefit
the state provided to someone else. This conclusion is noteworthy because
many existing analyses take the position that the Due Process Clause imposes
no meaningful limitations on a state's enforcement jurisdiction.12
To illustrate the effect of this analysis, take the cases of three different
vendors-the first is a traditional brick-and-mortar vendor who owns a store
and has employees in the taxing state; the second is a remote vendor who
actively advertises in the taxing state; and the third is a remote vendor whose
only connection with the state is making sales to the state's residents that
approach the vendor on their own. The brick-and-mortar vendor clearly
receives benefits from the state in the form of fire and police protection, roads,
and the like. The Due Process Clause would not impede the state from
exercising enforcement jurisdiction over that vendor. The second vendor
likely receives benefits from the taxing state in the form of legal protections
for its advertising activities; thus the state also should have enforcement
jurisdiction over this vendor under the Due Process Clause. However, the final
vendor receives no benefits from the state; the only benefits it receivesnamely, the liquefaction of the value of its assets (i.e., money for sales)-are
provided by the states' residents. As there is always a non-state intermediary
between benefits the state provides and the final vendor, the Due Process
Clause would prevent the state from exercising enforcement jurisdiction over
the vendor.
Thus, taking the due process limitations on enforcement jurisdiction
seriously demonstrates that merely removing Commerce Clause limitations
will not fully solve the states' issues; additional action will be required. This
Article proceeds in five Parts. The following Part II explores the current
landscape of state enforcement jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause and
develops the Due Process Clause's something-for-which-it-can-ask-return
requirement for enforcement jurisdiction. Part III examines how the
transactional theory of enforcement jurisdiction materializes from the due
process jurisprudence and explores potential justifications for and issues with
the theory. Part IV then homes in on how the transactional theory informs the
application of the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return requirement. Part V
demonstrates the impact of the Article's earlier analysis on the states' efforts
to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over remote vendors. This discussion
12.

See authorities cited supra note 6.
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illustrates the shortcomings of the states' efforts in this area, revealing the need
for alternative approaches to their enforcement jurisdiction issues. Finally,
Part VI concludes.
II. ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The relative ease with which transactions can be initiated and
completed over the Internet has contributed to, and likely accelerated, the
growth of interstate transactions in the United States.'" This growth is
presumably good for the economy but presents challenges for many states as
they struggle to apply their tax laws to these interstate transactions. 14 For
13.

See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SELECTED TAX

OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
1-3 (1996),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-GlobalElectronic-Commerce-1996.pdf; Bruce et al., E-tailer,supra note 3, at 736; Arthur J.
Cockfield, Jurisdictionto Tax: A Law and Technology Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV.
85, 85 (2004) ("The past several decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in crossborder trade and investment, partly in response to a reduction in legal barriers (e.g.,
tariffs and capital controls) and technological improvements that lower transportation,
distribution and communication costs. This trend has been accelerated by the advent
of the Internet and related information technologies, as well as the proliferation of
digital goods and services."); Groves, supra note 6, at 621 ("A brief perusal of the
Internet demonstrates that practically any product may be purchased online."); Edward
A. Morse, State Taxation ofInternet Commerce: Something New Under the Sun?, 30
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1113, 1128-29 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital
Biosphere: How the InternetIs ChangingTax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REv. 333, 363-367
(2002) (discussing difficulties that Internet-based commerce poses for traditional state
tax systems); Joondeph, supra note 6, at 110 ("[S]ales consummated over the
Internet-more broadly, sales consummated with out-of-state sellers through
whatever means-have contributed to a substantial and growing gap in the sales and
use tax structure."); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic
Commerce: Legal, Economic, Administrative, andPoliticalIssues, 34 URB. LAW. 487,
487 (2002) ("Being designed for a world of tangible products, the tax systems
employed by the states are ill suited for a world of electronic commerce."); Swain,
supra note 6, at 392-93 (observing that state tax codes are out of date); Varyani, supra
note 6, at 152, 155 n.24 ("As the way individuals in the United States make and
consume goods has changed, the system of imposing a tax on those transactions has
struggled to keep pace... . Note that the growth in the mail-order industry from 1967
to 1989 is dwarfed by the growth in online sales from 1992 to present day. The
difference in lost sales-tax revenue to states is accordingly large, meaning there is
POLICY

IMPLICATIONS
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example, one recent study found that the states' struggles resulted in the noncollection of $11.4 billion in sales and use tax revenues from sales made
through e-commerce in 2012." In large part, these struggles are the result of
an incompletely answered fundamental question of jurisdiction to tax: when
may a state compel a person to collect or pay a tax? In the literature, this
question is referred to as the "enforcement jurisdiction" question.'"
In many ways, enforcement jurisdiction is straightforward and
uncontroversial. When a state has jurisdiction to tax the subject matter of a
tax-referred to as "substantive jurisdiction"l 7-it likely has enforcement
jurisdiction over some person as well. After all, people earn income and
engage in consumption in the state, so if a state has substantive jurisdiction to
tax such income or consumption, it stands to reason that a person exists over
which the state also has enforcement jurisdiction." However, such a person

more at stake in the current debate than ever. With the continued growth of online
sales, states that collect sales tax will realize an increasing loss of revenue.") (internal
citations omitted); see also Edson, supra note 6, at 893; Hellerstein, Electronic
Commerce, supranote 6, at 426-27; Kendall L. Houghton & Walter Hellerstein, State
Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Perspectives on Proposalsfor Change and Their
Constitutionality, 2000 BYU L. REv. 9, 11-12 (2000); Michael J. McIntyre,
Commentary: Taxing Electronic Commerce Fairly and Efficiently, 52 TAx L. REV.
625, 628 (1997); Morse, supranote, 13, at 1114-15. For a detailed look at e-commerce
and its growth, see McLure, Jr., supra note 6, at 281-321.
15. See Bruce et al., Losses, supra note 3. This conclusion is not without
debate. See authorities cited supra note 3.
16. See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 3.
17. See, e.g., id.
18. See id. at 3-4 (arguing that a state must have both "substantive
jurisdiction" and "enforcement jurisdiction" in order to collect a tax and observing
that "the criteria that are employed for determining the existence of substantive tax
jurisdiction may be the same as those employed for determining the existence of
enforcement jurisdiction."); accordRosen & Bernstein, supra note 8, at 534. The idea
that a state must have nexus with both the transaction it seeks to tax (i.e., substantive
jurisdiction) and the person collecting or paying the tax (i.e., enforcement jurisdiction)
derives from Supreme Court precedent. See, for example, Allied-Signal, Inc. v.
Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992), and Goldberg v. Sweet, 488
U.S. 252, 263 (1989), though some commentators have questioned the scope of the
concept. See Mines, supra note 6, at 591-99 (taking issue with the concept that both
nexus with the person and nexus with the transaction are required, at least with respect
to sales and use tax actions); David F. Shores, State Taxation ofInterstate Commerce:
Quill, Allied Signal and a Proposal, 72 NEB. L. REv. 682, 719-21 (1993) (arguing
that the Due Process Clause should not require nexus with each of the person's
activities; rather, only the Commerce Clause should impose such a requirement).
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does not always exist, and the controversial issues arise when a state seeks to
exercise enforcement jurisdiction over an out-of-state person.19
Few doubt that a state has substantive jurisdiction over the objects of
interstate transactions when those objects are connected to the state, but it is
far from clear that the state has enforcement jurisdiction over out-of-state
people involved in those transactions. For example, consider Massachusettsbased Wayfair selling tableware to Floridians. Florida uncontroversially
would have substantive jurisdiction to impose use taxes on its residents'
consumption (use) of the tableware and in theory would have enforcement
jurisdiction over those residents. However, practical limitations-such as the
state's lack of information about the use and the residents' lack of will to
voluntarily pay the use taxes-prevent Florida from exercising enforcement
jurisdiction over its residents,20 so instead the state turns its attention towards
Wayfair. The same practical limitations to having Wayfair collect the use taxes
might not exist, but does Florida have the legal basis for enforcement
jurisdiction over Wayfair?
The answer to this question depends on the theory at the root of
enforcement jurisdiction. By engaging in a close examination of the Due
Process Clause limitations on enforcement jurisdiction, this Article develops
the "transactional theory" of enforcement jurisdiction that drives the state
taxation jurisprudence. As further explained in Part III, this theory demands
that both the state and the person engage in certain activities directed towards
the other before the state may exercise enforcement jurisdiction over the
person.

19.

Cf Lea Brilmayer, JurisdictionalDueProcess and PoliticalTheory, 39

U. FLA. L. REV. 293, 294 (1987) ("The justifications suggested by . . theorists should
shed some light on the issue of coercive power over nonresidents and interstate
disputes. These issues of interstate power are far more attenuated than simple
justification of the exercise of domestic power."); Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting
the Future: PersonalJurisdictionfor the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CMI. L. REV.

385, 387 (1998) ("It is long-arm jurisdiction, based on the acts and omissions of
nonconsenting, nonresident defendants, that has given courts and litigants the most
difficulty.").
20. See Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 8 (observing that enforcement
jurisdiction has "both theoretical and practical aspects. A State may have the
theoretical power to enforce a tax but nevertheless lack an effective enforcement
mechanism because the theoretically sound path to tax collection is administratively
or economically impractical.").
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Due process may be a vague concept, 21 even so, it has teeth: it asks
whether a state is acting in a manner that society finds acceptable according to
legal norms 22-whether a state action offends "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." 23 In the context of enforcement jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has "often identified 'notice' or 'fair warning' as the analytic
touchstone of due process . . . analysis." 24 The hallmark of "notice" or "fair
warning" is that a reasonable person could know that a certain legal effect
would occur from certain actions. 25 To ensure that people have appropriate

21. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) ('Due process' is an
elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according
to specific factual contexts."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) ("The
faculties of the Due Process Clause may be indefinite and vague, but the mode of their
ascertainment is not self-willed.").
22. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) ("Our
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking,' that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause.") (internal citations omitted); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 651 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that a practice that "was the norm when this
country was founded, was the norm when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in
1868, and remains the norm today" does not violate "fundamental fairness"); Rochin,
342 U.S. at 169 ("Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of
respect for those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for
the Court, are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental,' or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."') (internal citations
omitted); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) ("Due process of law in the
latter refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative
powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised
within the limits therein prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles of the
common law. In the Fourteenth Amendment, by parity of reason, it refers to that law
of the land in each State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved
powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and the
greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make their own laws,
and alter them at their pleasure."); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and
Punitive Damages: The ErrorofFederalExcessiveness Jurisprudence,79 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1085, 1118-23 (2006) (discussing the meaning of due process and observing that
it originates in the "law of the land" and protects "deeply rooted" rights and liberties).
23. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992); Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
24. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
25. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance
Excused, 51 VAND. L. REv. 581, 592 (1998) ("The notice requirement is understood
to be a matter of fundamental fairness: Citizens must be informed of their legal
obligations lest they unwittingly find themselves in violation of the law and subject to
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notice or fair warning of a state's enforcement jurisdiction over them, the
Court has held that the Due Process Clause has its own "nexus" inquiry: 26
"[t]he Due Process Clause demands that there exist 'some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person . . it seeks to tax,' as
well as a rational relationship between the tax and the 'values connected with

criminal punishment."); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 205-12 (1985) (discussing the
notice concept in the context of penal statutes and noting that "[t]he concern is ...
whether the ordinary and ordinarily law-abiding individual would have received some
signal that his or her conduct risked violation of the penal law"); Albert C. Lin,
Refining FairNotice Doctrine: What Notice is Required of Civil Regulations?, 55
BAYLOR L. REv. 991 (2003) (exploring the fair notice requirement for civil regulations
and proposing a clear standard relying on the notion that a reasonable person would
understand their affect); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency InterpretationsofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 66970 (1996) (describing the notice requirement in the context of agency rules as
requiring that "legal rules must give persons of 'ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that [they] may act accordingly."'); Trevor
W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal
Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 455, 455 (2001) ("The 'fair warning
requirement' implicit in the Due Process Clause demands that criminal statutes
provide 'fair warning ... in language that the common world will understand, of what
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed."') (internal citations omitted); Mila
Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1175-79 (2013) (describing
"the most familiar aspect" of the due process notice doctrine as addressing whether
reasonable people could understand the law's meaning and application); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1997) ("In each of these guises [of the
fair warning requirement for criminal laws], the touchstone is whether the statute,
either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that
the defendant's conduct was criminal."); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,

444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis

is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather,
it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
26. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
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the taxing State."'27 The following Sections more closely examine these two
aspects.

28

A. The Minimum-ConnectionAspect

The first aspect of the due process nexus inquiry-the "minimum
connection" aspect-focuses on the person's actions; it is satisfied when the
person "purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the
forum State." 29 Expanding on this standard, the Quill Court concluded that the
Due Process Clause does not require a person to have a physical presence in a
state in order to have the appropriate nexus with that state.30 Relying on
"comparable reasoning" to that used in personal jurisdiction cases, which also
consider whether a person has a minimum connection with a state,3 1 the Court
27. MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Rev., 553 U.S. 16, 24 (2008)
(quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 306).
28. The Appendix, infra, contains a chart providing an overview of the
constitutional restrictions on enforcement jurisdiction, including both the Due Process
Clause limitations and the Commerce Clause limitations discussed infra Part V.
29. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
30. Id. at 308.
31. Personal jurisdiction refers to a state's ability to subject a person to its
adjudicatory authority; that ability is controlled by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g.,
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753-58 (2014). The modem standard for
personal jurisdiction is rooted in a 1945 Supreme Court case involving the collection
of state unemployment taxes imposed on a foreign entity. Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In that case, the Court determined that Washington
State had the power to subject a foreign corporation, International Shoe, to its
authority-and thus collect unemployment taxes from International Shoe-based on
International Shoe's activities in the State. Id. at 321-22. International Shoe
manufactured and sold shoes across the nation but did not have any offices or stores
in Washington. Id. at 313-14. International Shoe's contacts with Washington were
limited to employing "eleven to thirteen salesmen under direct supervision and control
of sales managers located in St. Louis. These salesmen resided in Washington; their
principal activities were confined to that state; and they were compensated by
commissions based upon the amount of their sales." Id. at 313. Any orders received
by the salesmen were transmitted to International Shoe's Missouri office for
acceptance, and "when accepted the merchandise for filling the orders [was] shipped
f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state." Id. at 314.
Having determined that International Shoe was subject to the Washington courts'
jurisdiction in a suit for the taxes owed, the Court also found that Washington had the
ability to impose the tax in the first place:
Appellant having rendered itself amenable to suit upon obligations
arising out of the activities of its salesmen in Washington, the state
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instead looked to whether the person-Quill Corporation-had "purposefully
directed [commercial or business] activities at [the state's] residents." 32
Requiring such purposeful direction ensures that the person has notice or fair
warning that she may be subject to the state's enforcement jurisdiction.33
B. The Something-for-Which-It-Can-Ask-Return Aspect
The second aspect of the due process nexus inquiry examines the
state's actions and requires that a state's exercise of enforcement jurisdiction
over a person be rationally related to values connected with the taxing state or,
as more colloquially put, "whether the State has given anything for which it
can ask return."3 4 This aspect has not been deeply explored in the context of
may maintain the present suit in personam to collect the tax laid
upon the exercise of the privilege of employing appellant's
salesmen within the state. For Washington has made one of those
activities, which taken together establish appellant's "presence"
there for purposes of suit, the taxable event by which the state brings
appellant within the reach of its taxing power. The state thus has
constitutional power to lay the tax and to subject appellant to a suit
to recover it. The activities which establish its "presence" subject it
alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax.
Id. at 321. Rejecting a long-standing physical presence standard, the Supreme Court
declared that:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
32. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U. S. 462 (1985)); see also Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Rev., 483
U.S. 232, 250 (1987) ("[T]he crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities
performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the
taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for the sales.")
(internal citations omitted).
33. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.
34. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); see also
Swain & Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 219 ("In general, the Supreme Court has read
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enforcement jurisdiction, and one may fairly question whether the "rationally
related" requirement translates so cleanly to the question of whether a state
has given anything for which it can ask return; however, the jurisprudence
demonstrates that this is the case. In Wisconsin v. JC Penney Co.,3 the
Supreme Court presented perhaps its clearest expression of what the second
aspect of the due process analysis means for enforcement jurisdiction. JC.
Penney presented the question of whether Wisconsin could require J.C.
Penney, a company with stores in Wisconsin, to withhold a tax levied on its
non-Wisconsin-resident shareholders and measured by dividends derived from
Wisconsin-source income despite the fact that the dividends were declared and
paid outside of the state. 36 The Court found that Wisconsin did have the
authority to impose such an obligation on J.C. Penney, which had received
benefits from the state, noting that:
"Taxable event," "jurisdiction to tax," "business situs,"
"extraterritoriality," are all compendious ways of implying
the impotence of state power because state power has nothing
on which to operate. These tags are not instruments of
adjudication but statements of result in applying the sole
constitutional test for a case like the present one. That test is
whether property was taken without due process of law, or, if
paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the
state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and
benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling
question is whether the state has given anythingfor which it
can ask return.37

Other cases also support the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return
characterization of the second aspect. In a recent case, the Supreme Court
noted that "[t]he 'broad inquiry' subsumed in [the Due Process Clause]
requirements is . . . 'whether the state has given anything for which it can ask

return,"' before concluding that once that question is answered "the inquiry
shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax." 38 In National
Geographic Society v. CahforniaEqualization Board,3 the Supreme Court
the Due Process Clause as tying the states' taxing power to 'benefits' and 'protections'
that they confer upon taxpayers.").
35. 311U.S.at435.
36. Id. at 441-43.
37. Id at 444-45 (emphasis added).
38 . MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Rev., 553 U.S. 16, 24-25 (2008)
(internal citations omitted).
39. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
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held that the Due Process Clause did not bar California from taxing
transactions of a person that bore no relation to the activities of the person in
the state because the person had a minimum connection with the state and
received benefits from the state ("fire and police protection, and the like").40
Finally, indicating the meaning of the second aspect for enforcement
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has clarified that taxes are "a means of
distributing the burden of the cost of government"; 4 thus anyone who receives
a benefit from the state is subject to the state's enforcement jurisdiction,
regardless of the size or substance of that benefit.
Thus, no meaningful limitation on the substance of the benefit
provided by a state to a person justifying enforcement jurisdiction over that
person arises in the jurisprudence, a result that is not particularly surprising.
After all, a state's power to levy and collect taxes is considered "fundamental,"
"essential," and "basic," 42 and there appears to be little reason to require the
40. Id. at 558-61; see Hartman, supra note 6, at 1000 ("National
Geographic thus adopts the rule that a transactional nexus between the out-of-state
mail-order sales and the taxing state is not essential. The nexus linchpin for use tax
collection by the seller is that a connection need not be established for the particular
activity. Nexus depends upon the totality of the out-of-state seller's activities within
the taxing state. . .. The National Geographic Court noted that the Society's offices
had the 'advantage of the same municipal services-fire and police protection, and the
like-as they would have had if their activities, as in Sears and Montgomery Ward,
included assistance to the mail-order operations that generated the use taxes."').
41. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623 (1981)
(quoting Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522 (1937)).
42. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs., 520 U.S. 821, 826 (1997)
("The power to tax is basic to the power of the State to exist."); Wisconsin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (referring to taxation as "the most basic power
of government"); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931)
("The power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence of the government of the
states."); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930) ("The power of taxation is
a fundamental and imperious necessity of all government, not to be restricted by mere
legal fictions."); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 202
(1905) ("The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every civilized
government ... ."); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4. Pet.) 514, 561 (1830)
("That the taxing power is of vital importance; that it is essential to the existence of
government; are truths which it cannot be necessary to reaffirm."); Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448 (1827) ("We admit this power [of state
taxation] to be sacred . . . ."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824)
("The power of taxation is indispensable to [the states'] existence . . . ."); McCulloch

v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819) ("That the power of taxation is one
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states to give certain types of benefits in order to justify that power. However,
one may find the idea of a large tax bill for a small, state-provided benefit
unsettling and question this approach. Such concerns are justified but are
within the scope of substantive jurisdiction, not enforcement jurisdiction.
Enforcement jurisdiction concerns a person's obligation to collect or
pay an otherwise legitimate tax. Substantive jurisdiction addresses the
legitimacy of the tax, including whether the tax is unconstitutionally
unreasonable when compared to the amount of taxed activity in the state.43
Thus, though there may be room for a de minimis exemption from
enforcement jurisdiction when the person receives a very small benefit from a
state, concerns about the substance of the benefit received by the person are
properly in the realm of substantive jurisdiction issues and outside the scope
of this Article. There is no requirement of proportionality between the benefit
provided to the person by the state and the obligation imposed on the person
through the state's exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, and for good reason.
Unlike the actual tax itself, the amount of which can be proportioned to the
benefits a person receives from the state, an enforcement obligation is all-ornothing-either the person must collect or pay the tax or not. It would be
nonsensical to attempt to proportion such an obligation. Indeed, in determining
whether North Dakota had enforcement jurisdiction-substantive jurisdiction
was not at issue-over Quill Corporation, the Quill Court observed that Quill
Corporation had a minimum connection with North Dakota and that the tax
collection obligation in question was "related to the benefits Quill receives
from access to the State"; 44 the Court did not reference the amount of benefits
of vital importance ... [is a truth] which [has] never been denied."); see also DAVID
197 (1900) (observing that
"the matter of taxation .. . is a fundamental necessity for the maintenance not only of
all government, but of civilization").
43. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 16970 (1983) (observing that under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses a tax cannot
be "out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the appellant in that
State" or lead to "a grossly distorted result"). This requirement may only be imposed
by the Commerce Clause under current jurisprudence. See Commonwealth Edison,
453 U.S. at 622 ("The Court has, for example, consistently rejected claims that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands as a barrier against taxes
that are 'unreasonable' or 'unduly burdensome."'). The Supreme Court has indicated
that a deviation of "approximately 14%" would not be "out of all appropriate
proportion" whereas a deviation of "more than 250%" would be. ContainerCorp., 463
U.S. at 184. Query how one would determine the appropriate baseline against which
to make such a comparison; the Court has not provided clear guidance other than to
say that using the accounting method of the taxpayer will not suffice on its own. Id. at
182-84.
44. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1992).
AMES WELLS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TAXATION
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Quill received or the proportionality of Quill's collection obligation to that
amount.
So does the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect impose any
meaningful limitation on a state's exercise of enforcement jurisdiction? Many
commentators appear to conclude that it does not;45 however, exploring the
relationship of the two aspects of the Due Process Clause limitations on
enforcement jurisdiction reveals the transactional theory of enforcement
jurisdiction underlying the jurisprudence, which in turn informs the
application of the aspect. As developed in the following Parts, the transactional
theory requires that the state itself provide the benefit justifying enforcement
jurisdiction to the person in question; benefits received from non-state actors
will not suffice. Thus, the Due Process Clause imposes a meaningful limitation
on how the state must provide a person with something for which it can ask
return.
III. THE TRANSACTIONAL THEORY OF ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION

Perhaps because a state's power to levy and collect taxes is considered
so fundamental, essential, and basic, little attention has been given to the
theory underlying that power. However, understanding this theory is essential
to understanding when a state may subject an out-of-state person to
enforcement jurisdiction, particularly to understanding the limitations the
something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect imposes on enforcement
jurisdiction. Exploring the relationship between the two aspects of the Due
Process Clause limitations on enforcement jurisdiction leads to the conclusion
that a transactional theory of enforcement jurisdiction drives the
jurisprudence. Under this theory, enforcement jurisdiction derives from an
implied transaction between the taxing state and the person whereby each
party must purposefully act towards the other before the state has enforcement
jurisdiction over the person-the state must provide a benefit to the person and
the person must indicate acceptance of that benefit.46 This implied transaction
45. See authorities cited supra note 6.
46. The transactional theory of enforcement jurisdiction has an analogue in
the contract theory of state power, which typically addresses why a state has power
over in-state people. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE
63 (1959) ("Taxation as a price for services rendered seemed a natural complement to
the contract theory of the state."); cf Wendy Collins Perdue, PersonalJurisdiction
and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REv. 529, 536-46 (1991) (analyzing and
critiquing contract theory approaches to personal jurisdiction); Allen R. Stein, Styles
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might best be viewed as a transaction for which the Due Process Clause is an
escrow agent and the state's enforcement jurisdiction is the thing held in
escrow. Once both parties have fulfilled their obligations, the Due Process
Clause "releases" the enforcement jurisdiction-it permits the state to compel
the person to collect or pay its taxes. The person does not necessarily collect
or pay a tax in exchange for the state-provided benefits; the bargain is for the
state's authority to compel the person to collect or pay taxes.4 7 This Part
further explains the transactional theory as it manifests in the state taxation
jurisprudence before examining the strength of the theory.
A. The Relationshipof the Two Aspects of the Due ProcessNexus Inquiry

As observed above, one of the purposes of the Due Process Clause is
to ensure that a state acts in a manner that society finds acceptable according
to legal norms. Thus, the requirements of the Due Process Clause for
enforcement jurisdiction should comport with an underlying norm, or theory,
regarding the appropriate exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. Assuming that
the two aspects of the due process nexus inquiry are appropriate (i.e., taking
the Supreme Court at its word), they should provide insight into the theory of
enforcement jurisdiction underlying the jurisprudence. Indeed, the
transactional theory of enforcement jurisdiction follows from considering the
relationship of the two aspects.
Two characteristics of the two due process aspects' relationship in
particular illuminate the transactional theory of enforcement jurisdiction. First,
the two aspects establish two separate parties to the implied transaction, each

ofArgument and Interstate Federalism in the Law ofPersonal Jurisdiction,65 TEX.

L. REV. 689, 714-38 (1987) (reviewing the history of and critiquing the contract
theory for personal jurisdiction). For an in-depth critique of contract or transactional
theories of state power, see Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74

MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989). This Article avoids using the "contract theory" terminology
because the Article is primarily concerned with jurisdiction over out-of-state people.
47. This transactional theory should not be confused with the benefit theory
of taxation, which generally provides that a person's tax burden should be in some
way proportionate to the amount of benefits the person receives from the taxing
government. See, e.g., Graeme S. Cooper, The Benefit Theory of Taxation, 11 AUSTL.
TAX F. 397 (1994) (describing and analyzing the benefit theory of taxation); McLure,
Jr., supra note 6, at 381-82 (discussing the benefit theory with respect to e-commerce).
The benefit theory is concerned with how to determine a person's tax burden. The
transactional theory is not concerned with the actual tax burden placed on the person;
it is only concerned with whether the state has the jurisdiction to place a tax burden
on the person as a primary matter.
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with separate obligations.48 These parties are the person and the state; the first
aspect establishes the person's obligations, and the second establishes the
state's.49 Without both parties' obligations being satisfied, the state has no
enforcement jurisdiction over the person. This demonstrates that enforcement
jurisdiction is a derivative power but one that cannot arise from the unilateral
actions of either the person or the state.
Second, the two aspects establish that each party's obligation involves
engaging in actions purposefully directed towards the other. The somethingfor-which-it-can-ask-return aspect asks what the state has done for the person;
has the state given the person some benefit? The minimum-connection aspect
asks whether the person has indicated acceptance of that benefit. By
purposefully availing herself of the state's economic market, a person
demonstrates her intention to gain from interacting with the state and her
acceptance of state-provided benefits can be inferred. The interaction of the
two aspects thus demonstrates that a state's enforcement jurisdiction over a
person is derived from reciprocal actions between the state and the personthe implied transaction.50
48. See Edson, supra note 6, at 908 ("Quill appears to have established two
requirements for satisfying the due process inquiry: i) sufficient and purposeful
direction of the taxpayer's activities at a state's residents; and ii) rational relationship
between the tax imposed and the benefits the taxpayer received by virtue of being
allowed access to the state's market."); Jeffrey Friedman, Consumption Tax Nexus:
The Connection with the Transaction to Be Taxed, 38 GA. L. REv. 119, 123 (2004)
(noting the dual aspects of the due process nexus inquiry as announced in Quill).
49. See Joseph W. Blackburn, Due Process and States' Attempts to Tax
NonresidentLimited Partners,J. MULTIST. TAX. & INCENTIVES, Sept. 2009, at 20, 22
(2009) ("Some state court decisions have mistakenly treated the 'rational connection'
between state-provided values and a commercial actor's activities as establishing, by
itself, due process nexus. Such an approach fails to consider the essential due process
requirement that a commercial actor must initially direct its activities at a state, thereby
'purposefully availing' itself of the related benefits and protections of the state's
laws.").
50. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION
INCLUDING THE LAW OF LOCAL ASSESSMENTS 1-2 (1876) ("The justification of the
[tax] demand is to be found in the reciprocal duties of protection and support between
the state and its citizens, and the exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state
over the persons and property within its territory."); 1 ROBERT DESTY, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TAXATION: As DETERMINED IN THE COURTS OF LAST RESORT IN THE UNITED
STATES 53-54 (1884) (discussing the reciprocal nature of taxation); WELLS, supra
note 42, at 315-18 (same); Hartman, supra note 6, at 1000 ("When the state provides
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B. Justifying the TransactionalTheory of Enforcement Jurisdiction
As the primary focus of this Article is to demonstrate how the
transactional theory of enforcement jurisdiction informs the application of the
something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect, it is assumed that the theory
meets the Due Process Clause's fundamental fairness concerns. This
assumption appears warranted, as there are a number of potential grounds for
justifying the adoption of the theory. First, the transactional theory is deeply
rooted. Expressions supporting the theory can be found over the course of the
Supreme Court's state taxation jurisprudence in which the Court indicates that
jurisdiction to tax depends on the state's provision of benefits to the taxed
person and the taxed person's acceptance of those benefits;" similar theories

&

a substantial economic benefit to the production of income for the out-of-state seller,
the taxing state should be able to demand a tithe from the seller."); Swain
Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 266 ("[I]f '[tJaxes are what we pay for a civilized
society,' it makes sense to attribute the taxable base only to those states that are
providing enough 'civilized society' to warrant their exercise of jurisdiction over a
taxpayer."). Perhaps the most well-known and one of the simplest expressions of this
idea comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Taxes are what we pay for civilized
society." Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Rev., 275
U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an argument against the reciprocity
of taxes, see RICHARD T. ELY & JOHN H. FINLEY, TAXATION IN AMERICAN STATES
AND CITIES 13-18 (1888).
51.

See, e.g., Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 25 (2009);

MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Rev., 553 U.S. 16, 24-25 (2008); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 199-200 (1995); Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266-67 (1989);
Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1982); Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622-25 (1981); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S.
100, 108-09 (1975); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Rev., 419 U.S. 560, 562
(1975); Nat'l Bellas Hess Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967); GMC v.
Washington, 377 U.S. 436,441 (1964); Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450, 465 (1959); Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1949); Int'l
Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Tax'n, 322 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1944); State Tax

Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 180 (1942); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311
U.S. 435, 444 (1940); Michigan v. Mich. Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 344 (1932);
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 279-81 (1932); New York v. Latrobe,

279 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1929); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 490-91 (1925);
Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. W. Crawford Rd. Improvement Dist., 266 U.S. 187, 190 (1924);
Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466, 475-76 (1922); Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12,
14, 17 (1920); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 51 (1920); Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S.
217, 224 (1917); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S. v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S.

143, 147 (1915); Susquehanna Coal Co. v. Mayor of S. Amboy, 228 U.S. 665, 670
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have been relied on over the course of American and European theoretical
works on taxation.5 2 From one point of view, these roots indicate a general
acceptance of the fairness of the theory-it leads to the "right" result.53 Taxes
have long been considered the taxpayer's obligation for government benefits,
and a tax enforcement obligation is akin to a tax itself-the person is
compelled to contribute to the state, though through service instead of
money.5 4 Therefore, once a benefit provided by a state is accepted by the
person, the person is made better off by the state so the state should be able to
also be made better off by having the person collect or pay the state's taxes.
The actual amount of tax can be determined based on substantive jurisdiction
principles.
(1913); S. Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 76 (1911); Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209
U.S. 211, 230 (1908); New York ex rel. Edward & John Burke, Ltd. v. Wells, 208
U.S. 14, 23 (1908); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 202
(1905); Am. Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500, 521 (1904); Diamond Match
Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U.S. 82, 90 (1903); Bristol v. Wash. Cty., 177 U.S. 133, 144
(1900); Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U.S. 592, 615-16, 618-19
(1899); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220 (1897); Postal
Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 696 (1895); Clev., Cin., Chi. & St. Louis Ry.
Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439, 446-47 (1894); Robbins v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist.,
120 U.S. 489, 493-94 (1887); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196,
214-15 (1885); In re State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300, 322
(1872).
52. See generally, e.g., HAROLD M. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS: Two
HUNDRED YEARS OF THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (Donald
J. Curran ed., 1974) (describing various theoretical approaches to taxation, most of
which fundamentally accept that the government's initial right to tax derives from
providing a benefit to the taxed); CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE
(Richard A. Musgrave & Alan Peacock eds., 1958) (same).
53. Cf Brilmayer, supra note 46, at 20 ("When the analysis involves an
exchange, both parties to the exchange must bring something to the bargaining
table."); Perdue, supra note 46, at 541 ("[I]t is deeply disturbing to suggest that as long
as government provides you with something of objective value (that you may not
want), it can legitimately extract something from you (that you do not want to give
up).").
54. See EDwIN R. A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 3 (9th ed. 1921)
(discussing the historical development of taxation and observing that, in early stages
of taxation, "compulsory contributions are still largely personal services" and that
"[t]he first forced contribution of the individual to the maintenance of the common
welfare is always seen in this rude attempt to assess every one according to his ability
to bear the common burden-his faculty").
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The transactional theory might also be justified from an ex ante
perspective when the following goals are adopted: first, people should have
the right not to be subject to enforcement jurisdiction without justification;"
second, people should have notice or fair warning that they are subject to
enforcement jurisdiction in a state; and third, erosion of the states' fiscal bases
should be avoided. Accepting these goals-the first two of which track the
requirements of the Due Process Clause-and adopting a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance regarding the location, type, and amount of people's activities,"
people designing the principles of enforcement jurisdiction might initially
conclude that only one state-perhaps their state of residence or citizenshipshould be able to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over them, imposing a
meaningful limitation on the number of states able to exercise enforcement
jurisdiction over them and giving them clear notice of such jurisdiction.
Something like a strict physical presence or residence-based theory of
enforcement jurisdiction would arise under this approach.
However, assuming the taxing state provides benefits to out-of-state
people, then under this "one-state" approach the in-state people must either
bear the burden of collecting and paying taxes to finance those benefits or the
state must face fiscal shortfalls, being unable to compel the out-of-state people
to pay taxes. On the one hand, the in-state people might be comfortable with
bearing the burden of the benefits provided to out-of-state people on the
assumption that the burden of those benefits would approximate the burden of
benefits they receive from other states (for which they would have no
obligations). However, since the people are unaware of how much and what
type of out-of-state activity they and others will engage in, relying on this

55. In a sense, this goal expresses a concern about the possibility of "double
taxation." Double taxation in this context refers to two (or more) separate taxing
jurisdictions levying tax on the same taxable thing, such as income or a sale. In other
words, as a result of taxes being imposed by multiple taxing jurisdictions, more than
100% of the taxable thing would be subject to tax when double taxation occurs. One
may be inclined to think that double taxation is solely a Commerce Clause issue that
has no bearing on the due process analysis. While it is true that the Commerce Clause
has strong prohibitions against theoretical double taxation with the goal of preventing
the economic Balkanization of the states (see Quill, 504 U.S. at 312), the due process
jurisprudence also expresses a preference against double taxation to avoid excessive
tax burdens on a person by requiring some basic level of connection between a state
and the person before it is permitted to tax that person (see id. at 307-08). Allowing a
state with no connection to a person to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over the
person could arguably result in double taxation that may be classified as unfair even
if the burden is relatively small in amount.
56.

See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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"wash" assumption would be unappealing; the third goal of protecting the
states' fiscal bases would not be fulfilled.
Thus, the people might conclude that the one-state approach is not
acceptable. The first goal would prevent them from simply allowing all states
to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over them. Their concern about the
burden of benefits provided to out-of-state people might then lead to an
approach allowing any state that provides an out-of-state person with some
amount of benefits to subject that person to enforcement jurisdiction. Since
they would not be sure how many benefits any person might receive from a
state, they would prefer only a minimum amount be necessary in order to
prevent the free-riding issue underlying their concerns with the one-state
approach. Under this benefits-provided theory of enforcement jurisdiction the
states' fiscal bases would not be eroded by providing benefits to out-of-state
people, but states might provide subtle benefits to anyone, potentially
depriving people of notice or fair warning that they are subject to enforcement
jurisdiction. Recognizing this danger, the people would conclude that only
those out-of-state people who agree to receive the benefits from the state
should be subject to the state's enforcement jurisdiction, ensuring the requisite
notice or fair warning.
However, the people would soon discover that this agreement
principle, if not properly calibrated, would swing the pendulum too far in the
opposite direction and fail to address the third goal-if an out-of-state person
can merely state whether or not it agrees to receive benefits, the person could
effectively prevent a state's enforcement jurisdiction. Thus, the people would
need to establish when an out-of-state person would be deemed to have agreed
to receive the benefits based on the person's actions, elevating substance over
form. Relying solely on explicit consent would grant too much power to the
out-of-state person, so adopting an implicit consent approach based on the outof-state person's actions would be the necessary alternative. Since the people
would be unsure what their out-of-state activities will be, they will want to
ensure that the standard for implicit consent is one that guarantees they will
understand that by their actions they will be deemed to have accepted the
benefits of the state. Therefore, not every action directed towards a state should
establish this implied consent; only those actions that demonstrate an intention
to actively gain (i.e., to benefit) from interacting with the state should count.
The resulting standard would look quite similar to the purposeful availment
standard currently adopted under the minimum-connection aspect.
By requiring the purposeful direction of actions towards the state with
the intention of benefiting in order to establish a person's implied consent to
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receive benefits from the state, the people ensure that they will not be subject
to every state's enforcement jurisdiction. They will have notice and fair
warning of the potential consequences of their actions and largely prevent the
free-riding problem underlying the third goal. Along with the requirement that
they actually receive benefits from the state before they are subject to its
enforcement jurisdiction, this purposeful direction requirement establishes the
transactional theory. This discussion is not meant to provide the sole
justification for the transactional theory; rather, it is meant to demonstrate how
it might be justified. However, that the transactional theory can be justified
does not imply that it is without issues.
C Issues with the TransactionalTheory ofEnforcement Jurisdiction

'

The primary issues with the transactional theory arise from
considering the two requirements of the theory-the state's provision of
benefits and the person's implicit acceptance of those benefits-in isolation.
First, the benefits-provided requirement may appear to be a non-requirement
in action because it requires such a minimal effort from the state. Second, if
the purpose of the implied consent requirement is to give the person notice that
she might be subject to the state's enforcement jurisdiction, then it may not be
immediately obvious that purposeful availment of the state's economic market
is the appropriate way to satisfy that requirement.
Perhaps the biggest concern with the transactional theory is that the
benefits-provided requirement is a mirage, hiding what is in essence only a
consent theory of enforcement jurisdiction." States provide a number of
tangible benefits such as roads and fire and police protection virtually
indiscriminately to all who are within the state. Non-tangible benefits such as
legal protections and civilized society are also broadly provided, and one
suspects that states could articulate any number of benefits that they might
provide to out-of-state people. If such is the case, then the benefits-provided
requirement becomes no real requirement at all; it could always be met.
However, this concern is overblown. As an initial matter, it should be
recognized that states can and do provide a vast array of benefits. As the
benefits-provided requirement is concerned with ensuring that at a basic level
a state actually provides some benefit to people over which it seeks to exercise
authority, there is no compelling reason to restrict the substance or breadth of
the benefits the state chooses to provide. However, the state must act within
57. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 46 (discussing and critiquing consent
theories of jurisdiction); Brilmayer, supra note 19 (same); Perdue, supra note 46
(same); Stein, supra note 46 (same).
58. See authorities cited supra note 57 for descriptions and critiques of
consent theories of state power.
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its authority when providing that benefit, imposing a meaningful limitation on
the state. Though a state's authority to act outside of its territory may be
unsettled," it is not unrestricted; namely, the U.S. Constitution places
limitations on state actions. Of primary importance here is the limitation that
a state generally may not prohibit an out-of-state person engaged in interstate
commerce from accessing the state's market or its residents; such access is a
federally provided benefit." Thus, as a state has no authority to control access
to its market or residents in the context of interstate commerce, such access
alone cannot justify the state's enforcementjurisdiction under the transactional
theory.
Further, the benefits-provided requirement frames the implied consent
requirement, addressing the second issue with the transactional theory. By
indicating what the out-of-state person is impliedly consenting to-the receipt
of a benefit from the state-how the person might demonstrate that consent
becomes evident. Where a person is purposefully acting in a way as to gain
59. See Section IV.B, infra.
60. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) ("The mere fact
of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in one State from access to markets
in other States."); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)
("Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access
to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation
to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such
has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality."); Shaffer v. Carter, 252
U.S. 37, 52-53 (1920) ("That a State, consistently with the Federal Constitution, may
not prohibit the citizens of other States from carrying on legitimate business within its
borders like its own citizens, of course is granted . . . ."); see also Maine v. Taylor,

477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) ("The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of
States and localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce,
but it does not elevate free trade above all other values. As long as a State does not
needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to 'place itself in a position of economic
isolation,' it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its
citizens and the integrity of its natural resources.") (internal citations omitted). Though
Mainev. Taylor may appear to grant a state the authority to exclude out-of-state people
from engaging in interstate commerce connected to the state, it is unlikely that
excluding a person because it refuses to or is not required to pay the state's taxes would
be determined to be protecting the health and safety of the state's citizens. It is also
unlikely that there would not be "available nondiscriminatory alternatives" in the case
of state taxation.
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from the state, then it is reasonable to conclude that she has implicitly
consented to receive benefits from the state. She has notice that she might be
required to compensate the state for those benefits-that she could be subject
to the state's enforcement jurisdiction. Thus, a state could not arbitrarily define
what types of actions would indicate consent and hypothetically make all outof-state people aware of its approach, satisfying the notice requirement;6 1 the
actions implying consent must relate to benefiting from the state. That the
jurisprudence appears to focus only on commercial gains may be
unnecessarily restrictive, but that focus represents a reasonably clear way to
determine when a person is trying to benefit from interactions with the state.
A final issue with the transactional theory arises from its source.
Certainly, there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
is the end-all-be-all for establishing a theory of enforcement jurisdiction, and
alternative theories of enforcement jurisdiction may be formulated-for
example, a state could be viewed as possessing an inherent right to tax people
with some connection to its territory, thus not requiring the state to provide the
person with some benefit first. However, it is not the goal of this Article to
evaluate competing theories of enforcement jurisdiction; this Article is
concerned with how the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect
operates under current jurisprudence. That jurisprudence leads to the
transactional theory, which the Article now uses to illuminate the Due Process
Clause's requirements for enforcement jurisdiction.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTALLY
JURISDICTION

FAIR

EXERCISE

OF

ENFORCEMENT

To satisfy the Due Process Clause, a state's exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction must be fundamentally fair; a reasonable
person should have knowledge that the state may legitimately exercise
enforcement jurisdiction over her. 62 Under the transactional theory, two
things are necessary for a state's enforcement jurisdiction over a person
to exist: the state must provide her with a benefit and the person must
indicate acceptance of that benefit. Thus, a reasonable person should
have knowledge of both things' occurrences in order for the state's
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over the person to be
fundamentally fair. The Quill Court explained that the purposeful
availment standard under the minimum-connection aspect ensures that

61. See Britmayer, supra note 19, at 308-09.
62. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992); see also Int'l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
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a person has notice or fair warning that she has acted in such a way as
to implicitly accept the state-provided benefit. 6 3 For the Due Process
Clause to be completely satisfied, the person must also have knowledge
of having received a benefit from the state. The following discussion
describes how the prohibition of "extra-contact" enforcement
jurisdiction that arises from the transactional theory ensures such notice;
the discussion also explores the relationship of the extra-contact
prohibition to the prohibition of extraterritorial taxation.
A. The Something-for-Which-It-Can-Ask-Return Aspect's Prohibition
Against Extra-ContactEnforcement Jurisdiction

The derivative and reciprocal nature of enforcement jurisdiction under
the transactional theory illuminates how the something-for-which-it-can-askreturn aspect addresses the due process notice or fair warning concern: the
aspect prohibits a state from exercising extra-contact enforcement
jurisdiction-the state may not exercise enforcement jurisdiction over a person
who has only been affected by a state-provided benefit through his or her
interactions with a non-state actor.64 Unlike analyses that dismiss the
significance of the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect by focusing
on what the state must provide to the person-a benefit, an admittedly broad
thing-applying the transactional theory demonstrates a meaningful
restriction on enforcement jurisdiction by considering how the state provides
that benefit.
For example, suppose that a resident of Texas received a top-notch
public education from Texas schools and then married a resident of Minnesota
who had no personal connection with Texas. Texas provided the Texan with
the benefit of an education and would thus have enforcement jurisdiction over
the Texan (assuming other requirements for such jurisdiction were met).
However, the state-provided benefit does not extend to the Minnesotan;

63.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 307-08.

64. Cf COOLEY, supra note 50, at 184 ("Taxation is an act of government.
Government can only perform its functions by means of officers, and must make all
its demands upon its citizens through the medium of official action.... No individual
as such, or by virtue of his citizenship, can compel another to perform his duty to the
state."); DESTY, supra note 50, at 25 ("Incidental benefits to the public which might
be derived from private business enterprises will not justify taxation for the purpose
of raising money from the public .... ).
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though the Minnesotan's quality of life is arguably improved because of the
quality of her spouse's education," the Minnesotan only receives that
improvement because of the Texan's actions. Thus, the extra-contact
restriction would prohibit Texas from exercising enforcement jurisdiction over
the Minnesotan as a result of having provided the educational benefits to the
Minnesotan's spouse. Though this example may seem a bit strange from a tax
perspective, it demonstrates how one can think about how and to whom a state
provides a particular benefit.
The derivative nature of enforcement jurisdiction provides the initial
basis for the extra-contact restriction. Because enforcement jurisdiction is
derived in part from the state's actions, it is tied to the original state-provided
benefit from which the jurisdiction arises. Thus, the reach of that original
benefit defines the reach of the state's enforcement jurisdiction; the state's
power may not be extended by the actions of non-state actors who have
received the benefit. 66 The extra-contact restriction is reinforced by the
reciprocal nature of enforcement jurisdiction: the state must do something for
the person for enforcement jurisdiction over the person to arise; if the state
only provides a benefit to someone else, enforcement jurisdiction over the
person cannot arise, even if the third-party benefit-recipient later provides a
benefit to the person. 67 Basic principles of contract law support this
conclusion; parties to a contract have no ability to demand something from
third-party beneficiaries of the parties' actions-the reciprocity of the deal is
only between the parties to the contract. 8 To allow a state to derive power
over a person from benefits the state provided to a different person would
65. Good-humored friends of the Texan might disagree.
66. Two state supreme courts have reached a similar conclusion, albeit in
the context of the minimum-connection aspect of the due process nexus inquiry. See
Scioto Ins. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 279 P.3d 782, 784 (Okla. 2012) ("In the case at
hand, due process is offended by Oklahoma's attempt to tax an out of state corporation
that has no contact with Oklahoma other than receiving payments from an Oklahoma
taxpayer (Wendy's International) who has a bona fide obligation to do so under a
contract not made in Oklahoma."); Griffith v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 728 S.E.2d 74,
84 (W. Va. 2012) (failing to find due process nexus over an out-of-state person as the
result of the person licensing trademarks to a licensor who then sold products with
those trademarks to wholesalers and retailers in West Virginia).
67. Cf Lea Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory:
Towards a PoliticalPhilosophyoflnterstateEquality, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 389, 412

(1987) ("When an individual receives the benefits of a cooperative scheme, he or she
ought to help bear the costs. As with the doctrinal argument, this basis for state
coercion is absent when the state refuses to extend such benefits to outsiders.").
68.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 17

(AM. LAW INST.

1981) (observing that "the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is
a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange").
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violate the transactional theory of enforcement jurisdiction;69 exercises of
enforcement jurisdiction in such a situation would be unjust."o The restriction
against extra-contact enforcement jurisdiction thus guarantees the
fundamental fairness of state exercises of enforcement jurisdiction by ensuring
that a reasonable person has knowledge that she has received something from
the state that could justify the state's enforcement jurisdiction over her.
Further, in its personal jurisdiction cases, the Supreme Court has
recognized the principle that the defendant in question must by its own actions
purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum
state; merely causing an effect in the state by actions not directed towards it
does not create enough of a connection to the state.71 This direct interaction

69. The extra-contact restriction does not entail a rejection of traditional
agency principles. If another person is serving as an agent or representative of the
potential taxpayer, then it should be reasonable to conclude that any benefit provided
by a state actor to the other person is received by that person on behalf of the potential
taxpayer. See Handel, supra note 6, at 629 (discussing the application of agency and
affiliation nexus standards and arguing for broad application of these standards);
McLure, Jr., supra note 6, at 402-03 (approving of "nexus by agency" and "nexus by
affiliation" approaches).
70. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342 (1954) ("It is a
venerable if trite observation that seizure of property by the state under pretext of
taxation when there is no jurisdiction or power to tax is simple confiscation and a
denial of due process of law."); WELLS, supranote 42, at 72 (observing that the biblical
phrase "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" recognizes that a government
"can find no justification, in virtue of power to compel the payment of tribute or taxes,
to appropriate property (ofthe people) under circumstances in which similar action on
the part of a private citizen would be considered robbery"); Edson, supra note 6, at
905 ("A state should not be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over a party merely
because the party received accidental and unintentional economic and regulatory
benefits from a state. This is especially true when the party is unaware that it is
receiving such benefits and cannot conduct the appropriate business and tax planning
and compliance for its operations in that state to insure it conducts cost-effective
business, an economic interest shared by both the state and the taxpayer.").
71. See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122-23 (2014) ("[T]he
relationship must arise out of contacts that the 'defendant himself creates with the
forum State. ... Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum
State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the 'random, fortuitous,
or attenuated' contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the
State."); Kulko v. Superior Court ex rel. City of S.F., 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978) ("In light
of our conclusion that appellant did not purposefully derive benefit from any activities
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between the defendant and the state is essential to ensure that the defendant
has notice or fair warning that its actions might subject it to the jurisdiction of
the state.72 Likewise, only a state's own actions towards a person should be
able to establish and provide notice or fair warning that the state has provided
the person with a benefit that might justify the state's enforcement jurisdiction
over her. Failing to recognize the extra-contact restriction could lead to the
absurd result that the supplier of a supplier of a supplier, et cetera, of an instate vendor could be subject to the state's enforcement jurisdiction because
the state's provision of benefits to the in-state vendor trickled down to the
ultimate supplier." Taking the Wayfair example from earlier,74 Florida could
be said to have enforcement jurisdiction not only over Wayfair but also over
Wayfair's Virginia-based supplier of tableware and her North Carolina-based
supplier of clay because Florida provides benefits to its residents which in turn
affect Wayfair, the tableware maker, and the clay supplier when a Floridian
buys the tableware. A reasonable person down the chain would not have
knowledge that she had received something from the state that might justify
the state's enforcement jurisdiction over her.
Requiring the state itself to provide the benefit in question to the
person it wishes to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over admittedly
necessitates a degree of formalism in the Due Process Clause's limitations on
enforcement jurisdiction, particularly when viewed from the standpoint of the
person; after all she is better off regardless of whether the effect of a stateprovided benefit reaches her through a state actor or a non-state actor. After
some waffling, the Supreme Court rejected a formalistic approach to
determining whether a state had substantive jurisdiction to tax the "privilege
of doing business" in interstate commerce," observing that "[t]here is no
relating to the State of California, it is apparent that the California Supreme Court's
reliance on appellant's having caused an 'effect' in California was misplaced.").
72. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 471-73 (1985)
(discussing the fair warning requirement).
73. Cf Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on
State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REv. 77, 92 (1980) ("Causation in fact is not

sufficient reason for placing the jurisdictional burden upon the defendant, any more
than causation in fact is sufficient in the substantive context. As Prosser notes in the
substantive context: 'In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward
to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the discovery of America and beyond
.... some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the
basis of some social idea ofjustice or policy."').
74. See supra Part II.
75. The approach was a per se rule against taxes levied on the privilege of
doing business in interstate commerce. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977).
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economic consequence that follows necessarily from the use of the particular
words, 'privilege of doing business,' and a focus on that formalism merely
obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect." 76
However, "not all formalism is alike,"n and unlike the formalism introduced
by the "use of magic words or labels"" rejected in Complete Auto, the degree
of formalism here results from considering what types of actions by the state
would give a person the notice or fair warning of the state's enforcement
jurisdiction over the person necessary to satisfy the Due Process Clause.
Though the value of a benefit received may be the same regardless of who
delivers it, the state/non-state actor distinction addresses those due process
concerns, and thus its degree of formalism is meaningful and appropriate.
The extra-contact restriction may be analytically approached by
asking whether the state could hypothetically take the benefit in question away
from the person (or prevent the person from receiving it), placing aside
concerns about the public nature of state benefits and other limitations on state
actions. That is to ask, could the state continue to engage in the same actions
generally but prevent the person from receiving the benefit in question? If so,
then the state is providing the person with the benefit; if not, the state is not
providing the person with the benefit. In the Texas example above, Texas
could not continue to educate its residents and at the same time take away the
Minnesotan's benefit of an improved quality of life resulting from an educated
spouse-either her spouse would remain educated or she could find another
educated Texan to marry-demonstrating that that benefit is provided to the
Minnesotan by her spouse, not by Texas. Texas only provided benefits to the
spouse, which it could take away by denying the spouse an education while
still educating its residents generally. Many states already engage in this sort
of behavior-denying benefits to specific people-when they deny access to
state court systems due to the failure of an out-of-state corporation to register
with the state."
76. Id.
77. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1992) (noting that
"not all formalism is alike" before approving the formalistic bright-line physical
presence rule for substantial nexus for sales and use taxes).
78. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 284.
79. See Carol Andrews, Another Look at GeneralJurisdiction, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 999, 1074-75 (2012) ("Registration statutes ... remain coercive and
punish nonregistration through fines and forfeiture of the right to bring suit in local
courts."); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the
Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDozo L. REv. 1343, 1365-66 (2015) ("Each of the states
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B. The ProhibitionofExtraterritorialTaxation

The prohibition of extraterritorial taxation has been a staple of the
Supreme Court's state taxation jurisprudence. 0 This prohibition has roots in
fundamental theories of legitimate taxation and surfaces in both Commerce
Clause and Due Process Clause analyses of state tax actions.8 ' As a theoretical
matter, the transactional theory and the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return
aspect do not appear to contain any limitation against extraterritorial
enforcement jurisdiction. After all, the aspect only demands that the state
provide the person with a benefit. Practically though, to the extent that the
prohibition against extraterritorial taxation is based on a general prohibition
against extraterritorial state actions, 82 a state's authority to provide a benefit
justifying enforcement jurisdiction may be limited to its territory. 83 This
also codifies the penalties for non-registration in circumstances where a corporation
should have registered pursuant to the statute. These generally include an inability of
the defendant to sue in the state's courts, the payment of a fine, and the tolling of the
statute of limitations against the corporation.").
80. See, e.g., Joondeph, supra note 6, at 122-23 ("This prohibition on
extraterritorial taxes is a foundational principle of state taxation, a limit on state
authority that has been recognized by the Supreme Court since the mid- 1 800s.").
81. See, e.g., MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep't of Rev., 553 U.S. 16, 19
(2008); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 504 U.S. 768, 777 (1992); Quill, 504
U.S. at 311-14; Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164
(1983); Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 441-42 (1980); Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342 (1954); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
428-30 (1819); see also COOLEY, supra note 50, at 42-44, 121-23; DESTY, supra note
50, at 55-67; FREDERICKN. JuDsON, A TREATISE ON THE POWER OF TAXATION, STATE
AND FEDERAL IN THE UNITED STATES 499 (1903) ("This limitation of the taxing power
of the State to its lawful jurisdiction obviously does not depend upon the Fourteenth
Amendment. Like the limitation which requires that the tax shall be levied for a public
purpose, this also is inherent in the conception of a tax."); WELLS, supra note 42, at
310-14; Joondeph, supra note 6, at 128-32 (discussing the role of the prohibition
against extraterritorial taxation in defining a state's jurisdiction to tax).
82. See Joondeph, supra note 6, at 114 ("In our federal system, states
generally can legislate only with respect to those activities that occur within their
borders. This territorial limit on states' legislative jurisdiction is a basic, unstated
premise of our constitutional structure. Thus, although states generally are prohibited
from taxing values or activities occurring in other states, this restraint exists
independent of the dormant Commerce Clause.").
83. See Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal
Jurisdiction,63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 385 (1985) ("If territorial limitations on the reach
of state sovereignty actually exist, then any particular aspect of state power, such as
judicial jurisdiction, must necessarily be subject to those limits.").
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practical limitation would arise from the derivative nature of enforcement
jurisdiction-to ensure that the derivative enforcement jurisdiction is
legitimate, the action from which it derives must be legitimate.84 If a state's
power to act was limited by its territorial borders, then the state would have to
provide a benefit to a person within those borders in order to derive
enforcement jurisdiction over that person."
Therefore, not only would the state have to act within its borders in
providing the benefit, the benefit would also have to be received within the
borders; otherwise the state could impermissibly extend its powers past its
borders. In other words, spillover benefits from in-state activities would not
be sufficient for deriving enforcement jurisdiction over an out-of-state
person. 86 For example, suppose Wisconsin engaged in efforts to clean up Lake
Michigan in the state and as a result some of the benefits of the cleaned lake,
such as having a safe place for recreation, spilled over to Michigan residents
enjoying watersports in Traverse City, Michigan. Wisconsin would certainly
derive enforcement jurisdiction over its own residents for these cleanup
efforts. However, Wisconsin would not derive enforcement jurisdiction over
the Michigan residents for its cleanup efforts because Wisconsin has no
84. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice ofLaw, 98 YALE L.J.
1277, 1296 (1989) ("It is unfair (and thus a violation of individual rights) for a state
to exceed the legitimate scope of its sovereign power."); Weisburd, supra note 83, at
385 ("[S]tate action is more than an effort to provide a forum for dispute resolution; it
is an exercise of governmental power. Assertions of jurisdiction, therefore, must be
subject to the same limitations that exist for exercise of government power
generally.").
85. See Stein, supra note 46, at 743 ("Although the state may demand
obedience from its absent citizens, it has no corresponding right to act as sovereign to
other persons outside of its borders absent a connection to its internal regulatory
authority.").
86. Joondeph, supra note 6, at 123 ("While the federal government has the
authority to regulate conduct throughout the Nation, the legislative jurisdictions of the
states are generally confined to those activities occurring within their borders. As the
Supreme Court concisely stated in the 1905 case of Union RefrigeratorTransit Co. v.
Kentucky, 'the operation of state laws [is] limited to persons and property within the
boundaries of the State."') (footnote omitted); cf Int'l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep't of
Tax'n, 322 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1944) ("A state may tax such part of the income of a
nonresident as is fairly attributable either to property located in the state or to events
or transactions which, occurring there, are subject to state regulation and which are
within the protection of the state and entitled to the numerous other benefits which it
confers.").
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extraterritorial power over those people. If a Michigan resident were to sail
across the lake into Wisconsin waters, then Wisconsin could provide the
Michigan resident with a benefit relating to those sailing activities sufficient
to justify enforcement jurisdiction over the resident (though the minimumconnection aspect of due process might not be met).
There is much debate concerning the validity of extraterritorial
exercises of state powers, particularly in the areas of personal jurisdiction and
conflict of laws." However, what this debate means for the something-forwhich-it-can-ask-return aspect and the practical limitations on enforcement
jurisdiction are questions for another day. As it stands, the prohibition of
extraterritorial taxation would prevent a state from exercising enforcement
jurisdiction over an out-of-state person who has no connection to the state. The
minimum-connection aspect of the due process nexus analysis defines when
such a connection exists, so even if a state does have the ability to provide an
extraterritorial benefit, the state would not have enforcement jurisdiction over
a person receiving that benefit until the person purposefully avails herself of
the state's economic market.

87.

See generally Henry S. Noyes, The PersistentProblem of Purposeful

Availment, 45 CONN. L. REv. 41 (2012) (analyzing recent developments in personal
jurisdiction law); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial
Jurisdiction: Implicationsfor Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REv. 169, 172 (2004)

(arguing that that the "basic territorial framework of the limitations on state court
jurisdiction stems not from the Due Process Clause, or any other provision protecting
individuals from untoward assertions of state power, but from federal common law
rules developed under the influence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to allocate
judicial power among the states"). See also Brilmayer, supra note 84 (describing and
analyzing disagreements regarding the proper approach to choice of law issues);
Brilmayer, supra note 19, at 295 (arguing that due process jurisdiction should be
"based upon a political theory consistent with the norms underlying the American
Constitution, and should reflect the criteria of justification that such underlying
political norms implicitly incorporate"); Paul D. Carrington & James A. Martin,
Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 227
(1967) (analyzing various approaches to justifying state exercises of power); Harold
L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772 (1983)

(describing and critiquing various approaches to choice of law theory); Perdue, supra
note 46 (analyzing and critiquing various conceptions of the limits of personal
jurisdiction); Sheehan, supra note 19, at 387 (analyzing approaches to personal
jurisdiction); Stein, supra note 46 (arguing that "assertions ofjurisdiction, as exercises
of power, ought to reflect the general limits on state sovereignty inherent in a federal
system"); Weisburd, supra note 83, at 385 (analyzing the role of territoriality in
exercises of personal jurisdiction).
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C Evaluatingthe Something-for-Which-It-Can-Ask-Return Aspect's
Limitations on Enforcement Jurisdiction

Reflecting a principled approach towards the analysis of enforcement
jurisdiction standards, Professor Walter Hellerstein urges that three lessons
inform such analysis:
First, the issue is one of enforcement jurisdiction, not
substantive jurisdiction, and the question is whether the tax
can or should be enforced, not on whether it can or should be
imposed. Second, there is no reason as a matter of principle
why the jurisdictional standards for enforcement jurisdiction
should be the same as the jurisdictional standards for
substantive tax jurisdiction. And third, because the key issue
is one of enforcement, practical rather than theoretical
concerns should be paramount in resolving it."
Applying these three lessons to the something-for-which-it-can-askreturn aspect's limitations on enforcement jurisdiction yields three
fundamental questions about the limitations. First, should a state have to
provide a person with a benefit before the state can compel the person to
collect and remit a tax? Second, is there a reason that due process should
require a state to provide a benefit in order to justify both substantive
jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction? And third, should the underpinnings
of the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect trump the practical
concerns regarding a state's ability to enforce its tax laws?
The third question is the most fundamental, and reasonable minds can
disagree about its answer. For instance, with respect to use taxes, some have
argued that because a vendor is in the most administratively practical position
to collect the taxes the vendor should collect and remit them as long as the
administrative costs do not outweigh the tax. 9 However, this pressure to
require vendors to collect and remit tax for the benefit of the state indicates a
need to take theoretical due process limitations on enforcement jurisdiction
88. Hellerstein, supranote 8, at 58-59.
89. See, e.g., Swain, supra note 6, at 345 ("As between collecting tax from
each individual consumer or from the seller, it is more administratively practical to
collect the tax from the seller. Thus, anyone making taxable sales to consumers within
the taxing jurisdiction should have a collection obligation, subject to a de minimis
threshold below which the cost of collection exceeds the benefit.").
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seriously. The power to impose tax or a tax collection obligation is vast and
liable to abuse;"o failure to apply the due process limitations rigorously may
result in the violation of a vendor's rights. As it stands, the jurisprudence
establishes the right not to be subject to enforcement jurisdiction until one
receives and accepts a benefit from the state.
The first two questions are answered by observing that enforcement
jurisdiction has a substantive element to it-a person subjected to it has a
substantive obligation to do something for the benefit of the state, to collect or
pay a tax.9 ' As such, an enforcement obligation is akin to a tax itself, as noted
above, 92 and thus there must be some substantive justification for the
collection obligation." This characteristic makes enforcement jurisdiction
inherently different from personal jurisdiction, under which a state has the
authority to determine the person's substantive obligations to the state or
someone else; a person subject to personal jurisdiction has no definite
obligation to act for the benefit of the state.94 Thus, it is improper to fully
90. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1875) ("Of all
the powers conferred upon government that of taxation is most liable to abuse.");
COOLEY, supra note 50, at iv ("[W]hen one considers how vast is this power, how
readily it yields to passion, excitement, prejudice or private schemes, and to what
incompetent hands its execution is usually committed, it seems unreasonable to treat
as unimportant, any stretch of power-even the slightest-whether it be on the part of
the legislature which orders the tax, or of any of the officers who undertake to give
effect to the order.").
91. This substantive element is perhaps more evident in the case of a
requirement to collect tax from another person, as in the case of a vendor collecting a
sales or use tax from its customer, but in theory the substantive element is no less
present in the case of collecting a tax from oneself, as in the case of self-reported and
paid income taxes.
92.

See supranote 54.

93 See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342 (1954) ("It would
be a strange law that would make appellant more vulnerable to liability for another's
tax than to a tax on itself."). This observation directly contradicts the assertions of
some commentators that there is no reason for a person to argue that it should not be
subject to enforcement jurisdiction because it does not receive a benefit from the state.
See, e.g., John A. Swain, Misalignment of Substantive and Enforcement Tax
Jurisdictionin a Mobile Economy: Causesand Strategiesfor Realignment, 63 NAT'L
TAX J. 925, 927-28 (2010) ("Hellerstein (2003) cautions that the question of whether

an item is subject to a state's substantive jurisdiction is not the same question as
whether a person fairly may be asked to assist the state in collecting and remitting a
tax on that item. Thus, it is a non sequitur, for example, for a remote seller to argue
that it should not be subject to a use tax collection obligation because the seller does
not benefit from in-state government services.").
94. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879-80
(2011) (discussing standards for personal jurisdiction and observing that "[t]he Due
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equate enforcement jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction;95 there must be
something more for enforcement jurisdiction, some reason that the state may
compel a person to collect or pay a tax. That "something more" is contained
in the requirements of the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect and
provides the reason that, at a basic level, a state must provide a benefit in order
to justify both substantive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.
Further, as alluded to earlier,96 the state's obligation to provide a
benefit to a person is not illusory in the face of the minimum-connection
aspect; the requirements of both aspects must be satisfied to ensure that the
state's exercise of enforcement jurisdiction is fundamentally fair. An
alternative approach to this concern is asking whether the extra-contact
restriction is necessary in light of the prohibition against extraterritorial
taxation. At first blush, it appears that the extraterritorial prohibition
encompasses all that is needed to define the scope of state enforcement
jurisdiction. After all, if a state cannot derive enforcement jurisdiction over an
out-of-state person having no connection with the state, it is true that it should
not matter if the effects of a state-provided benefit reach the person through a
state actor or through a non-state intermediary.
However, the extra-contact restriction serves an important role: it
clarifies that a state cannot provide a sufficient benefit to an out-of-state person
solely through the person's interactions with non-state actors. In other words,
the restriction clarifies that interactions with non-state actors, even if such
actors are residents of the state, outside of the state are not activities of a person
Process Clause protects an individual's right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property
only by the exercise of lawful power. This is no less true with respect to the power of
a sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power
of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its sphere.") (internal
citations omitted); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945)
(discussing the connections necessary to bestow a state with the authority to adjudicate
a claim against an out-of-state person); see also Sheehan, supra note 19, at 387
("Personal jurisdiction is a court's power to make a binding adjudication of a person's
rights and obligations."). Such adjudicatory authority might result in a default
judgment against the person if the authority is ignored, but this potential does not
transform the state's personal jurisdiction over the person into a substantive obligation
to contribute to the state or other person; rather, a default judgment is more properly
viewed as a decision on the person's substantive obligations.
95. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992) (invoking
"comparable reasoning" rather than identical reasoning to that used in the personal
jurisdiction context when considering standards for enforcement jurisdiction).
96. See supra Section III.C.
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within the reach of the state's authority. This is the case even if such
interactions could serve as the basis for satisfying the minimum-connection
aspect. Thus, though the same facts may satisfy both the minimum-connection
and something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspects in a significant number of
cases,9 7 there are times when one aspect could be satisfied but the other not. 98
One of the biggest current areas of frustration in taxation for the states is the
difficulty of exercising enforcement jurisdiction over remote vendors. The
following Part explores this situation regarding remote vendors, providing an
example of when a person might purposefully avail herself of the state's
economic market but not receive benefits from the state.
V. ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION OVER REMOTE VENDORS

Beyond the intellectual exercise of exploring an undeveloped area of
doctrine, what is the importance of understanding the transactional theory of
enforcement jurisdiction and the resulting due process limitations on such
jurisdiction? Under the state taxation jurisprudence, the Due Process Clause is
not the sole source of constitutional limitations on enforcement jurisdiction;

97. See, e.g., Handel, supra note 6, at 711 (arguing that one receives
benefits from the state by purposefully availing herself of the state's economic market
and concluding, tentatively, that "Due Process nexus is the equivalent of in personam
specific jurisdiction over the person that is required to account for and pay over the
tax"); Hellerstein, Electronic Commerce, supra note 6, at 434 ("It is a 'fundamental
requirement of both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses that there be "some
definite link, some minimum connection between a state and the person, property, or
transaction it seeks to tax."' This so-called 'nexus' requirement derives from the
virtually axiomatic proposition that the exercise of a state's tax power over a taxpayer
or its activities is justified by the 'protection, opportunities and benefits' the state
confers upon the taxpayer or its activities. If the state lacks the definite link or
minimum connection with the taxpayer or its activities, it has not 'given anything for
which it can ask return."') (footnotes omitted); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 ("In
this case, there is no question that Quill has purposefully directed its activities at North
Dakota residents, that the magnitude of those contacts is more than sufficient for due
process purposes, and that the use tax is related to the benefits Quill receives from
access to the State.").
98. As an example of the inverse situation where the something-for-whichit-can-ask-return aspect is satisfied but the minimum-connection aspect is not,
consider a person recreationally driving through a state, thereby receiving benefits
from the state at least in the form of useable roads but not directing commercial
activities at the state's residents. The implied transaction under the transactional
theory would not be complete because the person would not have fulfilled her
obligation, and the state would not have enforcement jurisdiction over her.
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the Commerce Clause imposes its own limitations,99 which are widely
presumed to set a higher bar to state action than the due process limitations.' 0 0
However, the states and their allies are undertaking efforts to weaken the
Commerce Clause limitations, particularly with respect to remote vendors.
These efforts have-in the case of income taxes-and will (if successful)-in
the case of sales and use taxes-thrust the Due Process Clause limitations on
enforcement jurisdiction into the spotlight as the primary limitations on
enforcementjurisdiction. This Part describes the Commerce Clause limitations
on enforcement jurisdiction and the efforts to remove them before
demonstrating how the Due Process Clause-particularly, the something-forwhich-it-can-ask-return aspect-will limit the effectiveness of those efforts.
Many remote vendors will remain beyond the states' enforcement jurisdiction
99. The Appendix, infra, contains a chart providing an overview of the
constitutional restrictions on enforcement jurisdiction, including both the Due Process
Clause limitations and the Commerce Clause limitations.
100. Fatale, supra note 6, at 565 ("The 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case, Quill
v. North Dakota, suggested that the Due Process Clause was to play second fiddle to
the Commerce Clause in such tax matters, and would not typically be relevant given
the more likely, more rigorous application of the latter clause."); Handel, supra note
6, at 629; McLure, Jr., supra note 14, at 490 ("The Due Process Clause ... provides
remote vendors little protection from a duty to collect use tax. The Commerce Clause
provides out-of-state vendors substantially more protection from a duty to collect use
tax."); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise ofEconomic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX
REv. 157, 188 (2012) ("[T]he courts that have evaluated the scope of their states'
economic nexus formulations have indicated that those formulations provide
heightened jurisdictional bars that are more onerous than that provided by the Due
Process Clause."). But see Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the
Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-MeasureApproach, 1998 Sup. CT. REv. 193,
213 (1998) ("Note that our approach differs slightly here from Complete Auto. We do
not interpret the Commerce Clause to require a separate nexus more stringent than that
imposed by the Due Process Clause because that is not required to further protect
interstate commerce against state taxes that accord a preference to local enterprises.");
Handel, supra note 6, at 630 ("If the Due Process Clause requires certain minimum
contacts with a state, the Commerce Clause does not require a greater number of
contacts."); John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction:A Jurisprudentialand
Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 319, 372 (2003) ("The central
conclusion of this Article is that physical presence is not an income tax nexus
requirement. Accordingly, substantial nexus for income taxes may approach the due
process minimum contacts standard."); Thimmesch, supra, at 88-91 (section
discussing the "Gratuitous Elevation of the Commerce Clause over the Due Process
Clause").
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when Commerce Clause limitations are removed; federal intervention may be
necessary to fully solve the states' remote vendor issues.
A. Commerce Clause Limitations on Enforcement Jurisdiction

The Commerce Clause imposes limitations on state jurisdiction to tax
to ensure that the national economy is not unduly burdened by any one state's
actions.' In other words, the Commerce Clause protects the states against
each other's nationally-economically harmful actions. To this end, the
Supreme Court has articulated the following "Complete Auto test" 02 for
determining whether a state satisfies the jurisdiction-to-tax requirements of the
Commerce Clause:
[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge
so long as the "tax [1] is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly
apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by
the State." 10 3

The first prong of this test-that the tax be applied to an activity with
a substantial nexus with the taxing state-establishes the primary limitation
on a state's enforcement jurisdiction.' 04 The Quill Court clarified that this
101. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 ("[Tlhe Commerce Clause and its nexus
requirement are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual
defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national
economy.").
102. The test derives from the 1977 case of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.

Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), and is thus commonly referred to as the "Complete Auto
test." See, e.g., Swain, supra note 100, at 328.
103. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (quoting Complete Auto, 430 U.S., at 279).
Whether this test achieves the Commerce Clause's goal of protecting the workings of
the national economy has been the subject of much debate (see, e.g., Joondeph, supra
note 6, at 114, 133-39 (discussing potential inefficiencies of the Commerce Clause
standard); Thimmesch, supra note 100, at 196-97 (critiquing the Commerce Clause
standards)), but that question is outside of the scope of this Article. Many observe that
the CompleteAuto test incorporates not only Commerce Clause ideals but Due Process
Clause ideals as well. See, e.g., Fatale, supra note 6, at 578.
104. The fourth prong of the Complete Auto test mirrors the something-forwhich-it-can-ask-return aspect of the Due Process Clause, and the Supreme Court has
examined both in conjunction. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 622-24 (1981). As such, the fourth prong may also impose limitations on
enforcement jurisdiction, though some commentators view the prong as "dead." See,
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prong not only looks to the activity taxed but also requires that a person have
a substantial nexus with a state before she is subject to the state's enforcement
jurisdiction. o' In the context of sales and use taxes, Quill confirmed that
"substantial nexus" for purposes of this prong requires a physical presence in
the taxing state. 106 The Supreme Court has not articulated whether a physical
presence is necessary to satisfy the first prong of the Complete Auto test in the
context of other types of taxes,o 7 leaving the door open for the states to
significantly limit the Commerce Clause restrictions on enforcement
jurisdiction for income taxes.
1. Income Taxes-State Economic Nexus Standards

In the face of the Supreme Court's silence, many state courts have
considered whether the Commerce Clause's physical presence rule for sales
and use tax enforcement jurisdiction carries over to income taxes and have
found that the answer is "no.""0 s These courts instead have found a substantial
e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate: The Futureof the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibitionon Discriminatory Taxation, 155 U.

PA. L. REv. PENNuMBRA 196, 205 (2007) ("Courts have heretofore been so reluctant
to . . . apply the 'fairly related' prong of Complete Auto [that it] has become a dead

letter.") (comments of Brannon P. Denning). A greater understanding of the

&

something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect could lead to a revival and
strengthening of the fourth prong in this area. See Sylvia Dennen, The FourthProngThe Court'sNeglected Stepchild?, 33 ST. TAx NoTEs 743 (Sept. 6, 2004) ("The fourth
prong has often been considered to closely resemble the Due Process Clause regarding
the state's ability to take without giving value in return."); Michael M. Giovannini
Matthew P. Hedstrom, The Fairly Related Prong:Back From the Dead or Flash in
the Pan?, 78 ST. TAx NoTEs 127 (Oct. 12, 2015) (discussing the relationship between
and current developments regarding the fourth prong and the Due Process Clause).
105. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (referring to Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't ofRev.,
386 U.S. 753 (1967), and applying the first prong to the person).
106. Id. at 317.
107. Id. at 314 ("[W]e have not, in our review of other types of taxes,
articulated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for
sales and use taxes . . . ."); see also Swain, supra note 100, at 321-23 (discussing the

absence of a clear substantial nexus standard for non-sales and use taxes); Thimmesch,
supra note 100, at 165 ("However, despite the Court's affirmation of the physical
presence rule, there has been considerable conflict regarding whether this rule applies
to taxes other than sales and use taxes.").
108. Borden Chems. & Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2000); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Ind. Dep't of State Rev., 895 N.E.2d 140 (Ind.
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nexus when the person earns income from intangible property used in the state,
such as trademarks, franchises, or credit card accounts, or when the person has
a substantial economic presence in the state, which may be demonstrated by
deriving a certain amount of income from transactions with residents of the
state. 1' Though the standards developed in these state court decisions differ
from each other, they are commonly lumped together under the term
"economic nexus."" 0 However, as Professor Adam Thimmesch has observed,
"most state courts adopting the economic nexus standard have failed to
provide any formulation for how that test is to be applied";' this makes it
likely that those standards will impose little meaningful burden on the
states.112
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in all of the economic nexus
cases that have come before it." 3 Presumably, one of the reasons that the
Supreme Court has declined to weigh in on these economic nexus cases is that
it views Congress as the appropriate federal entity to define the enforcement
jurisdiction requirements imposed by the Commerce Clause." 4 In fact, the

Tax Ct. 2008); KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Rev., 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010);
Bridges v. Geoffrey, Inc., 984 So. 2d 115 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 2008); Geoffrey, Inc. v.
Comm'r of Rev., 899 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 2009); Capital One Bank v. Comm'r of Rev.,
899 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. 2009); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 908 A.2d 176 (N.J.
2006); Kmart Props., Inc. v. Tax'n & Rev. Dept., 131 P.3d 27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001),
rev'd, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005); A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 132 P.3d 632 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2005); Geoffrey Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993); see also
Swain, supra note 100, at 358-62; Thimmesch, supra note 100, at 173-81.
109. See, e.g., Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 13 (finding Commerce Clause nexus
as the result of earning income from intellectual property used in the state); Tax
Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E. 2d 226, 232 (W. Va. 2006) (finding
Commerce Clause nexus as the result of having a substantial economic presence in the
state).
110. See generallyThimmesch, supranote 100 (analyzing various economic
nexus standards).
111. Id. at 181.
112. See id. at 188-91.
113. See authorities cited supra note 108.
114. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) ("[The
Commerce Clause] aspect of our decision is made easier by the fact that the underlying
issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that
Congress has the ultimate power to resolve. No matter how we evaluate the burdens
that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with
our conclusions."); see also Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Rev., 386 U.S. 753, 760
(1967) ("The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy
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Quill Court appeared almost reluctant to endorse the physical presence rule for
sales and use taxes, relying heavily on stare decisis and the settled expectations
of people in the sales and use tax area.IIs
Emboldened by their states' courts' decisions and the Supreme
Court's denials of certiorari, many state legislatures have enacted so-called
"economic nexus" or "factor presence" statutes, which provide that a person
will be subject to the state's income tax if it has a certain amount of property,
payroll, or sales in the state.116 For example, California's factor presence
statute provides that a person will be subject to the California Corporation
Franchise Tax, an income tax, if that person has sales in the state of at least
$500,000, real and tangible personal property in the state worth at least
$50,000, or compensation paid in the state of at least $50,000.17 The
Multistate Tax Commission, a consortium of state tax administrators which
provides guidance and assistance to the states in an effort to promote
uniformity and best tax practices, has published a model factor presence
statute, which the California approach tracks."' As of 2015, at least 28 states

free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a
domain where Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.").
115. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311, 318 ("While contemporary Commerce Clause
jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time
today, Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our recent cases....
[T]he continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles
of stare decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law.").
116. See, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 23101(b) (Westlaw 2017)
($500,000 in sales, $50,000 in property, $50,000 in payroll); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-216a (Westlaw 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.621 (Westlaw 2017)
($350,000 in sales); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5751.01(H)I) (Westlaw 2017)
($500,000 in sales, $50,000 in property, $50,000 in payroll); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68,

§ 1218(H)(3)46) (2012) (repealed 2015) ($500,000 in sales, $50,000 in property,
$50,000 in payroll); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.04.067(1) (Westlaw 2017)
($250,000 in sales, $50,000 in property, $50,000 in payroll); COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 201-2:39-22-301.1 (2)(b) (Westlaw 2017) ($500,000 in sales, $50,000 in property,
$50,000 in payroll); CONN.

Q & A ON ECONOMIC NExUS

DEP'T OF REv. SERVS., INFORMATION PUB.

2010(29.1),

($500,000 in sales).

117. CAL. REv. & TAX. § 23101(b). These values are indexed for inflation.
Additionally, if 25% of a person's sales, property, or payroll occur in the state, then
the person will be subject to the Corporation Franchise Tax.
118. See Dan Bucks & Frank Katz, Explanation of the Multistate Tax
Commission's ProposedFactorPresence Nexus Standard, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 1037
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have adopted some sort of economic nexus standard, including seven states
that have adopted factor presence statutes. 11 9 Under such a statutory scheme
or under judicial formulations of the economic nexus standard, a state might
attempt to subject a remote vendor to its enforcement jurisdiction based solely
on the fact that residents of the state made a certain amount of purchases from
the remote vendor.1 2 0
2. Sales and Use Taxes-OverturningQuill

Efforts to overcome Commerce Clause limitations on enforcement
jurisdiction over remote vendors carry over to the sales and use tax area,
despite the bright-line physical presence rule announced in Quill. 12 1 Quill is
the primary thorn in a state's side when it comes to efforts to require a remote
vendor to collect use taxes on its sales to residents of the state. And it is a
potentially big thorn-as noted, an estimated $11.4 billion in sales and use tax
revenues went uncollected in 2012 in large part as the result of the states'
inability to require remote vendors to collect such taxes under the Quill rule.12 2
(Sept. 30, 2002); Multistate Tax Commission, FactorPresenceNexus Standard, 25
ST. TAx NOTES 1035, 1035 (Sept. 30, 2002).
119. See authorities cited supra note 116; see also Shirley Sicilian, Dormant
Commerce Clause and Due Process Nexus: A Recent History and Some Developing
Issues, J. MULTIST. TAX. & INCENTIVES, June 2015, at 40, 41 (2015).
120. It would be incorrect to say that the remote vendor has Commerce
Clause or Due Process Clause nexus with the state as a result of the operation of the
factor presence standard. Nexus is a constitutional concept, and the nexus standard
cannot be set by statute. Rather, the statute embodies the state's belief as to what types
of activities would meet the nexus standard of either the Commerce Clause or the Due
Process Clause. Thus, states with factor presence statutes presumably believe that
making a certain amount of sales attributed to the state is sufficient to meet the
constitutional nexus standards.
121. See, e.g., Handel, supra note 6, at 623 ("The controversy is also
currently represented by general interest in the collection of use taxes on internet
purchases, proposed federal legislation, and proposed and recently enacted state
legislation, the agendas of state and local tax professional meetings, and the prediction
by a Bureau of National Affairs article that nexus will be among the most active topics
this year."); Mines, supra note 6, at 583 ("[M]y comments are limited to sales and use
taxes. I focus on them because they have drawn the most attention with respect to
electronic commerce. . . ."'); see also Groves, supra note 6; Hartman, supra note 6;
Hellerstein, Deconstructing,supra note 6, at 564; McLure, Jr., supra note 14; Charles
E. McLure, Jr., RadicalReform ofthe State Sales and Use Tax: Achieving Simplicity,
Economic Neutrality, andFairness, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 567 (2000); Morse, supra
note 13; Swain, supra note 6; Hal R. Varian, Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13

HARv. J.L. & TECH. 639 (2000).
122. See authorities cited supranote 3.
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Many remote vendors have used the fact that they cannot be required to collect
taxes in certain states to gain a competitive advantage over vendors with a
physical presence in those states.1 2 3
Given the states' dissatisfaction with the burden Quill imposes on
them, many have called for Congress or the Supreme Court to remove the Quill
physical presence rule.1 24 Legislation to repeal the rule has consistently been

123. Swain, supranote 93, at 933-34 (addressing efforts of online retailers
to avoid tax collection obligations); Varyani, supra note 6, at 169-75 (discussing
advantages remote vendors might receive from the physical presence rule); Small
Business PanelReviews Mail Order Use Tax Issue, 55 ST. TAX REv. (CCH), Oct. 3,
1994, at 2-3 (noting the competitive advantage that mail-order companies have over
local retailers). That such a competitive advantage exists demonstrates the second side
of the states' inability to collect use taxes on sales made by remote vendorsdifficulties collecting the taxes from the actual consumers. The effects of the Quill
decision have arguably led to the somewhat common belief among consumers that
they do not or should not owe sales or use taxes on purchases made through the
Internet. See Varian, supra note 121, at 641 ("Since use taxes are so difficult to
enforce, most people regard out-of-state purchases as being effectively tax free.").
However, if a vendor is not subject to the state's enforcement jurisdiction and thus
does not collect use tax from its customer at the time of sale, the consumer is legally
obligated to report and pay the use tax to the state. See POMP, supra note 2, at 6-40 to
6-42. Unfortunately for the states, use tax compliance among individual consumers is
dismally low. See NINA MANzI, RESEARCH DEP'T MINN. HOUSE OF REPS., USE TAX
COLLECTION ON INCOME TAX RETURNS IN OTHER STATES (2015), http://www.house

.1eg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf (noting that the percentage of taxpayers who
report use tax in states where that tax can be reported on income-tax returns is
approximately 1.9%). Administrative burdens and political concerns prevent the states
from enforcing such compliance as a practical matter. See, e.g., Hellerstein,supra note
8, at 23-24 (discussing administrative problems states face in collecting use taxes from
individual consumers); Swain, supranote 6, at 353 ("Sales made by remote sellers are
subject to a de facto exemption. .. . [T]he Supreme Court has required that a seller be
physically present in a state before the state can impose its use tax collection
obligation, and it is administratively impractical for a state to directly collect use taxes
against individual consumers. Individual consumers seldom self-assess use tax, and
so the tax goes unpaid."); Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 118 W. VA. L. REv.
147, 151-60 (2015) (noting difficulties creating the current "use tax gap").
124. See, e.g., Brian Bardwell, CouncilofState Governments Asks Congress
to Act on E-Commerce Taxation, 79 ST. TAX NOTES 27 (Dec. 21, 2016); David
Brunori, MTC Market-Based SourcingEfforts Are Good, 78 ST. TAX NOTES 915 (Dec.
21, 2015) ("[I]f Congress does not act, there is a good possibility that the Supreme
Court will overturn Quill. States are getting very aggressive regarding sales tax nexus.
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introduced in Congress since Quill was decided but has struggled to gain
traction.1 25 However, buoyed by support from commentators and the business
community, including Amazon.com, 126 the Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA)
More litigation is coming."); Jennifer DePaul, Task Force Promises Legislation
Designed to Overturn Quill, 79 ST. TAX NOTES 185 (Jan. 18, 2016) [hereinafter
DePaul, Task Force]; Jennifer DePaul, Congressional Supporters Tried to Get EFairness into Spending Bill, 79 ST. TAX NOTES 26 (Jan. 4, 2016); Jennifer DePaul,
GovernorsPressfor PassageofMFA, 75 ST. TAX NOTES 79 (Jan. 7, 2015) [hereinafter
DePaul, Governors]; Jennifer DePaul, States Ready to Explore Other Options for
Remote Sales Tax Legislation, 78 ST. TAX NOTES 648 (Nov. 24, 2015) (same)
[hereinafter DePaul, States]; Maria Koklanaris, Governors: States Will Act on Their
Own for E-Fairness, 79 ST. TAX NOTES 119 (Jan. 11, 2016); Annette Nellen, Still
Seeking DigitalDirection, 78 ST. TAX NOTES 797 (Dec. 14, 2015).
125. Hartman, supra note 6, at 1015-17 (discussing possible congressional
actions to overturn the holding of NationalBellas Hess, from which the Quill physical
presence rule derives); Swain, supra note 6, at 370 ("Unfortunately, Congress has not
proven to be an effective forum for state tax reform. Ever since Bellas Hess was
decided in 1967, legislation that would 'overrule' the physical presence test has been
introduced, only to flounder."); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Fading Bright Line of
Physical Presence:Did KFC Corporation v. Iowa Department of Revenue Give States
the Secret Recipe for Repudiating Quill?, 100 KY. L.J. 339, 340 (2012) ("States have
responded to these losses by aggressively and continuously lobbying Congress to
legislatively overturn the physical-presence rule. Despite those efforts, however,
Congress has not yet given states the reprieve that they seek.").
126. See, e.g., Marketplace Fairness:Leveling the PlayingFieldfor Small
Business: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 112th Cong.
(2012); Swain, supranote 93, at 940-41 (arguing for various solutions tojurisdictional
misalignment issues, including overturning Quill); Varyani, supra note 6, at 173-76;
Robert D. Plattner, Quill: Ten Years After, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 1017, 1017 (Sept. 30,
2002) ("[T]he Quill decision qualifies as a blunder of major proportions by the Court.
... [T]he states should push the Supreme Court to reexamine Quill by bringing a new
test case that seeks to change not only the outcome in Quill but also the framework of
Supreme Court decisionmaking in state tax nexus cases. While it may be naive to think
that the Court would abandon Quill, it is hard to believe that the Supreme Court is
satisfied with the anachronistic, illogical state of constitutional doctrine embodied in
Quill. Perhaps, given another opportunity to do better, the Court would seize on it.").
Amazon.com's support of the states' efforts to require remote vendors to collect their
taxes is likely explained by an apparent shift in business model from "sales-tax-free"
shopping to quick delivery of products ordered online. Quick delivery requires having
fulfillment centers in many states, meaning that Amazon.com's physical presence
footprint today is much larger than it was 15 years ago. Therefore, Amazon.com is no
longer a remote vendor in many states. It makes sense that if it is required to collect
state taxes that it would want its online competitors to also be required to collect those
taxes. See POMP, supra note 2, at 6-41; Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Tax Fight, Amazon
Hands Baton to eBay, N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (Apr. 22, 2013, 9:49 PM),
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passed the Senate in 2013 before stalling in the House of Representatives.1 27
The MFA would discard the Quill physical presence rule for a state wishing
to impose use tax collection obligations on remote vendors as long as the state
enacts certain safeguards and tax simplification measures. 128 Though the MFA
has not yet been passed, support for it and similar measures among states
remains strong. 129
In addition, there are rumblings that the Supreme Court should
reconsider and overturn Quill's physical presence rule.'10 In a recent case not
involving the rule, Justice Kennedy, who concurred with the Quill majority on
stare decisis grounds,13 1 noted that "it is unwise to delay any longer a
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/in-tax-fight-amazon-hands-baton-to-ebay/
("So what about Amazon? Why did it abandon the fight? Not because it felt altruistic.
It was a business decision. As Amazon has grown, it has become better positioned to
handle the tax hit. And perhaps more important, it is moving to build physical
warehouse and shipping centers in many states so that it can offer faster delivery
services, in some cases within 24 hours. That means it would most likely have had to
collect sales tax anyway.").
127. 160 CONG. REC. S597 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2014) (tabling "a resolution
adopted by the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
memorializing the Congress of the United States to pass and the President of the
United States to sign the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013"); Harry J. Reske, U.S
Senate Approves Marketplace Fairness Act, 68 ST. TAX NOTES 499 (May 13, 2013)
(noting the U.S. Senate's passage of the S.743 by a 69-27 vote "[a]fter more than a
decade of deliberation"). For a discussion of the MFA and the issues surrounding it,
see Henchman, supra note 3.
128. Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Congress (2015). For
analysis of how the MFA might affect one state, see James Bull Sterling, Remote Seller
Sales and Use Tax Law: How ProposedLaw Will Impact South Carolina, 65 S.C. L.
REv. 827 (2014).
129. See, e.g., DePaul, Governors, supra note 124 (reporting on efforts to
pass MFA); Nellen, supra note 124 (discussing states efforts to overturn Quill). But
see No Regulation Without Representation Act, H.R. 5893, 114th Cong. (2016)
(codifying the Quill physical presence rule); Jennifer DePaul, Republican Senators
Urge Congress to Reject MFA, 78 ST. TAX NoTEs 711 (Dec. 7, 2015) (reporting on
opposition to MFA).
130. See DePaul, Task Force, supra note 124 (reporting on efforts to get the
Supreme Court to reconsider Quill); DePaul, States, supra note 124 (same); see also
David Brunori, It's Time to Overturn Quill, 55 ST. TAX NoTEs 497 (Feb. 15, 2010)
(advocating for the overturning of Quill); Plattner,supra note 126, at 1017 (same).
131. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 320 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I also agree that the Commerce Clause holding of Bellas Hess should
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reconsideration of the Court's holding in Quill. A case questionable even when
decided, Quill now harms states to a degree far greater than could have been
anticipated earlier."132 Justice Kennedy's concurrence-which no other
Justice joined-harmonizes with the feelings of many commentators, 133
though others observe that Quill's endorsement of the physical presence rule
was primarily based on stare decisis grounds and that little has changed of
importance since that decision that should lead the Court to change its
position. 134 Even so, given Justice Kennedy's sentiments, a direct challenge to
the physical presence rule might win the attention of the Court and could lead
to the judicial discarding of the rule, despite the fact that the Court clearly
views Congress as the most appropriate actor. 135 Recognizing this, South
Dakota has passed a law requiring a remote vendor to collect the state's sales
and use taxes if the vendor has over $100,000 in sales of goods or services
delivered into the state or over 200 transactions for goods or services delivered
into the state,136 and the Alabama Department of Revenue has issued a
regulation effective January 1, 2016, which requires certain remote vendors
with more than $250,000 of sales into the state to collect and remit use taxes

not be overruled. Unlike the Court, however, I would not revisit the merits of that
holding, but would adhere to it on the basis of stare decisis.") (citation omitted); see
also Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J.
concurring) ("Three Justices concurred in the judgment, stating their votes to uphold
the rule of Bellas Hess were based on stare decisis alone.").

132. Direct MarketingAss'n, 135 S. Ct. at 1135 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. See, e.g., McLure, Jr., supranote 6, at 394-95; Plattner, supranote 126,
at 1017 (encouraging states to "push the Supreme Court" to overturn the "blunder of
major proportions" that is the Quill decision); Shores, supranote 18, at 683 (asserting
that Quill is "a short-sighted, poorly reasoned decision likely to create more problems
than it solves"); Swain, supra note 6, at 355-70 (discussing the perceived shortfallings of the Quill decision and means of overturning it); see also Hartman, supra
note 6, at 1006-08 (discussing the need to overturn the Bellas Hess ruling from which
the Quill physical presence rule derived).
134. See Arthur R. Rosen & Hayes R. Holderness, Quill Is Still Relevant, 65
ST. TAXNOTEs 285 (July 23, 2012); Arthur R. Rosen & Matthew P. Hedstrom, QuillStare at the Decisision, 60 ST. TAX NOTES 931 (June 27, 2011).
135. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318; Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Rev., 386 U.S.
753, 760 (1967).
136. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 10-64-1 to 10-64-9 (2017).
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to the state. 13 7 Both of these actions have produced legal challenges,18 priming
the pump for potential Supreme Court action.
B. Benefits Providedto Remote Vendors

Though the Commerce Clause has traditionally dominated the
analysis of enforcement jurisdiction,' 4 0 the states' efforts described above

'

demonstrate that the Commerce Clause's time in the spotlight is waning. 1

137. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 810-6-2-.90.03 (2016). Tennessee and
Massachusetts also took administrative actions to disregard the physical presence rule,
but so far litigation has not begun against these actions. See TENN. COMP. R. & REGS.
1320-05-01-.129 (2017); Mass. Dep't of Rev. Directive 17-1 (Apr. 3, 2017).
138. See Answer to Notice of Appeal, Newegg Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., No. S.
16-613 (Ala. Tax Trib. Aug. 26, 2016); Notice of Appeal, South Dakota v. Wayfair,
Inc., No. 32 Civ. 16-000092 (S.D. 6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017); see also Stephanie
Cummings, PartiesEagerfor Ruling on Removal in South Dakota Quill Challenge,
2016 ST. TAX NoTEs 122-2 (June 24, 2016); Maria Koklanaris, Retailer Challenges
Alabama's Economic Nexus Rule, 80 ST. TAX NOTEs 918 (June 20, 2016); Maria
Koklanaris, South Dakota Sues to Enforce Nexus Law and Is Sued to Block It, 2016
ST. TAx NoTEs 84-1 (May 2, 2016).
139. See Maria Koklanaris, Both Sides Pleased With Court Ruling Striking
Down South Dakota Remote Sales Tax Law, 2017 ST. TAX TODAY 44-2 (Mar. 8, 2017)
(noting South Dakota representatives' desire to take their case to the US Supreme
Court); DePaul, Task Force, supra note 124; Nellen, supra note 124 ("At least one
state took action in 2015 to help the Court revisit Quill. Alabama issued a new rule
that requires sellers with a 'substantial economic presence' to register and collect sales
and use tax, effective for transactions occurring on January 1, 2016."). In addition, the
National Conference of State Legislatures Executive Committee Task Force on State
and Local Taxation is undertaking an effort to draft model legislation that could lead
to a legal challenge to Quill.
140. Fatale, supra note 6, at 566; Sicilian, supra note 119, at 40 ("For the 20
or so years after Quill, a major focus of state tax litigation then became whether the
dormant commerce clause also required a physical presence for state imposition of
corporate income or franchise tax. Due process 'minimum' contacts seemed to take a
back seat to dormant commerce clause 'substantial' nexus."); see also Quill, 504 U.S.
at 313 (noting that a person "may have the 'minimum contacts' with a taxing state as
required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the 'substantial nexus' with that state
as required by the Commerce Clause").
141. See David Brunori, The End of Quill, 67 ST. TAx NoTEs 591 (Feb. 25,
2013) (anticipating the imminent overturning of the Quill decision (though ultimately
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This decline provides an occasion to illuminate the effect of the Due Process
Clause limitations on enforcement jurisdiction by applying them to situations
involving remote vendors. 142 Many argue that by making sales to a state's
residents, a remote vendor has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the
state's economic market, thus satisfying the due process nexus inquiry. 143
Assuming this purposeful availment argument is correct and the minimumconnection aspect is satisfied, the Due Process Clause will still prevent a state
that does not provide the remote vendor with constitutionally sufficient
benefits from exercising enforcement jurisdiction over that remote vendor.
Those remote vendors who do not have property or conduct activities in the
taxing state will not receive such benefits, even if they sell to the state's
residents that approach them though a website, telephone call, or even a
physical visit.
The question of whether a state provides a remote vendor with a
benefit sufficient to justify the state's enforcement jurisdiction over the vendor
is more complex than it first appears. This Section considers three illustrative
examples of vendors, all of which sell to the taxing state's residents that
approach the vendors with orders, to demonstrate the application of the
something-for-which-it-can-ask-return aspect of the due process nexus
inquiry. The first type of vendor is a traditional "brick-and-mortar" vendor
with a store and employees in the taxing state. The second type of vendor is a

proving incorrect by basing the overturning on the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013,
the piece's sentiments are informative)).
142. See Fatale, supranote 6, at 567-68 (noting the renewed significance of
the Due Process Clause in matters of state taxation); Sterling, supra note 128, at 85051 (observing that even if the MFA passes Commerce Clause scrutiny, it would still
be subject to Due Process Clause challenges); Benton & Calhoun, supra note 6 ("Now,
in light of states' increasing aggressiveness in asserting economic nexus theories for
income tax purposes-and state courts' acceptance of those theories-there is much
less justification for the reduced reliance on the due process clause in state income tax
cases . . . ."); Amy Hamilton, Due Process Nexus Questions Would Follow Quill
Reversal, 62 ST. TAX NOTEs 361 (Nov. 11, 2011) (reporting on potential due process
concerns following an overturning of Quill).
143. See Fatale, supra note 6, at 629; Handel, supra note 6, at 640-42;
Mines, supra note 6, at 614-16; accordQuill, 504 U.S. at 307-08; Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 476 (1985) ("So long as a commercial actor's efforts are
'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State, we have consistently
rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction
there."). But see Edson, supranote 6, at 939-40 (arguing that a "taxpayer who receives
unsolicited orders" from a state's residents and fulfills those orders has purposefully
directed its activities towards the state for purposes of sales and use tax actions but not
for income and other'direct tax action purposes).
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remote vendor that advertises in the state, and the third type is a remote vendor
whose only connection to the state is that it sells to the state's residents.
1. The TraditionalBrick-and-MortarVendor

As a result of a traditional brick-and-mortar vendor's physical
presence in the state, the state provides the vendor with many of the benefits
that traditionally justify enforcement jurisdiction, such as fire and police
protection and a legal system providing a civilized society.144 Enforcement
jurisdiction based on these benefits does not run afoul of either the
extraterritorial prohibition on taxation or the extra-contact restriction. Thus, if
you are a Florida-based vendor, Florida has enforcement jurisdiction over you.
Though the case of the brick-and-mortar vendor is uncontroversial, such a
vendor provides a baseline against which to compare remote vendors.
By definition, a remote vendor does not have a physical presence in
the taxing state. Therefore, unlike a traditional brick-and-mortar vendor, the
state could not provide the remote vendor with many of the traditionally noted
benefits since they relate to the person's physical presence in the state.
Because a remote vendor is unlikely to receive many traditionally noted
benefits, alternative types of benefits must be considered.
2. The Remote Vendor Advertising in the State

The second type of vendor to consider is a remote vendor that
contracts for-or does its own-advertising in the taxing state. 145 Here the
state potentially provides the remote vendor with a number of benefits relating
to its advertising activities, such as the creation of a legal and technical
infrastructure through which the advertising can occur and, if in-state
advertising firms or media providers are used for the advertising, the legal
infrastructure for engaging in business with those firms or providers. Like the
traditionally noted state-provided benefits, these benefits should justify
144. See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1797
(2015); Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 25 (2009); Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1982); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 624-29 (1981); Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551, 558-61 (1977).
145. The question of where email or Internet advertising takes place is an
important question, but one outside the scope of this Article.
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enforcement jurisdiction under the something-for-which-it-can-ask-return
aspect.
As an initial matter, the prohibition against extraterritorial taxation
would not prevent the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over this type of
remote vendor as the vendor establishes a presence in the state's territory by
advertising in the state and receives benefits as a result. For example, if the
remote vendor engages in transactions in the state, then it has received a
benefit from the state's infrastructure for conducting such transactions. The
state's legal system might facilitate the remote vendor's ability to contract with
a media provider to provide advertising in the state, thus benefitting the
vendor. If the media provider failed to keep its end of the bargain, then the
remote vendor presumably would have the capability to sue in the state courts
on its contract.
Further, the extra-contact restriction also would not prevent the
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over this type of remote vendor because
the benefits in question are provided to the remote vendor by state actors, be
they courts, regulators, or enforcement agents. For instance, if the remote
vendor engages in a transaction with a media provider in the state, then the
vendor has received the benefits of the state's legal infrastructure supporting
that transaction through the state's courts or agents. That the state itself is
providing the benefits is demonstrated by observing that the state could
hypothetically continue to provide that infrastructure generally but deny its
benefits to the vendor by forbidding it from invoking its protections. Many
states do just this-deny benefits to specific people-for businesses that have
not registered with the state. 146
3. The Remote Vendor Only Selling to State Residents

The final type of vendor under consideration is the remote vendor
whose only connection with the taxing state is selling to residents of the state
who order from the vendor. Because such a remote vendor has no intangible
property in the taxing state and conducts no activities in the taxing state, the
prohibition against extraterritorial taxation would appear to limit the state's
ability to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over the vendor. Even so, many
argue that, by selling to the state's residents, a remote vendor establishes a
connection with the state (i.e., satisfies the minimum-connection aspect) and
that the state provides such a remote vendor with the benefits of a consumer
base, roads allowing the shipment of products to the resident customers, and a

146. See authorities cited supranote 79.
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legal infrastructure that allows for transactions to occur. 147 Given that a state
has no basic authority to grant or deny an out-of-state person market access, 148
the argument must be that selling to a resident of a state and shipping products
to the resident should be considered activities of a remote vendor within the
state for which the state provides benefits. Though these arguments may have
initial appeal, the extra-contact restriction would prevent the exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction based on such benefits. The remote vendor is only
affected by the state's provision of benefits to other people with whom the
vendor interacts; the state could not hypothetically continue to act as it does
generally but take away any benefit received by the remote vendor.
Alternatively stated, selling and shipping to a resident from outside a state are
not activities in the state for which the state can provide a sufficient benefit,
and the state would not be able to compel a remote vendor engaged only in
those activities to collect or pay a tax.
For example, take the case of a Florida consumer base. Floridaprovided infrastructure and legal protections are benefits that serve to create
the consumer base-Floridians are placed in a position to consume. However,
the benefit that Wayfair, a remote vendor with respect to Florida, receives from
Florida's consumer base is money for tableware sold; Wayfair is able to
liquefy the value of its assets. That money/ability is not provided through a
147. See Handel, supra note 6, at 699-701; Hartman, supranote 6, at 1009
("The government of the taxing state conferred benefits and gave support, protection,
and opportunities in the development of the consumer market."); Swain, supra note
100, at 378-79 & n.331 ("[T]he out-of-state seller receives benefits in excess of what
is provided to its delivery media. For example, not only does the state protect the
trucks, it protects the remote seller's goods. Further, the state provides a legal system
that allows the remote seller to enforce the trucking company's obligation to deliver
goods rather than abscond with them. This same legal system protects the seller's right
to enforce the obligations of its customers. Numerous other protections and benefits
could be identified that extend beyond mere delivery of the product.... Taxes are
what we pay to live in a society that allows a market to operate in the first instance.
Like it or not, the government is a 'silent partner' in the economy (one that often is
not appreciated until it ceases to function).

. .

. Simply put, a remote seller could not

do business in a lawless society. Indeed, a seller in a lawless society would be
compelled to be physically present to enforce the obligations of the buyer and to ensure
the safe delivery of its product. Remote commerce can only exist in an orderly society
in which government has undertaken these functions on behalf of all beneficiaries of
that orderly society, including remote sellers."); Bucks & Katz, supra note 118
(arguing that a market state provides benefits to a remote vendor).
148. See supra note 60.
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state actor, but through a non-state intermediary, the customer. Florida could
not continue to provide the benefits that create a consumer base generally, but
remove Wayfair's monetary benefit. Instead, Florida would have to remove
the consumer base altogether to deny the monetary benefits to Wayfair,
demonstrating that Wayfair's customers provide it with the benefits, not the
state. Other constitutional concerns aside, the state could attempt to forbid its
residents from conducting business with Wayfair, but such actions would offer
no guarantee that the consumers actually would stop buying from Wayfair,
especially since the sales are taking place in another state. Thus, Florida cannot
derive enforcement jurisdiction over Wayfair from the fact that it received
money from a customer that Florida put in a position to consume; the extracontact restriction prevents it.
Similarly, the state's provision of roads allowing a remote vendor's
products to reach the resident consumers does not represent a benefit provided
to the remote vendor through a state actor, assuming that the remote vendor
uses a common carrier to deliver the products and does not deliver them itself
or through an agent.1 4 9 The remote vendor receives the benefit of having its

149. Common carriers have occupied a unique position in state taxation
jurisprudence-unlike other businesses, such as the advertising firms discussed above,
which might create nexus for an out-of-state person, common carriers have been
deemed not to establish jurisdictional hooks on their customers for the states. See Nat'l
Bellas Hess v. Dep't of Rev., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) ("[T]he Court has never held
that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose
only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States
mail. Indeed, in the Sears, Roebuck case the Court sharply differentiated such a
situation from one where the seller had local retail outlets, pointing out that 'those
other concerns . .. are not receiving benefits from Iowa for which it has the power to
exact a price."'). Quill overruledNat'1 Bellas Hess to the extent it required a physical
presence for the minimum-connection aspect of due process nexus inquiry to be met,
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992), but it is unclear if Quill
changed the status of common carriers with respect to the benefits-received question.
See AT&T Commc'ns of Md., Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 950 A.2d 86 (Md.
2008) (agreeing with the taxpayer that "[a]n unspoken, but necessary, corollary [of the
Quill and Nat'1 Bellas Hess decisions] ...

is that a common carrier cannot be deemed

to be the agent of the out-of-state seller for the purpose of creating a nexus and
permitting state taxation of the interstate sale (or use in the state)."). If the status of
common carriers for the benefits-received question changes such that they can be
considered agents of the vendor, then the conclusions herein may depend on whether
the vendor retains title to the property sold after delivering it to the common carrier.
Though the Court rejected formalist approaches to the constitutionality of state tax
actions in Complete Auto, cases adopting formalist approaches towards sales and use
taxes often considered where title passed and have not been overruled. See, e.g., Gen.
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goods delivered to its customers because the common carrier can and is willing
to ship its products to the state's residents using the state-provided roads. Thus,
as long as the state continues to maintain the roads and engage in other actions
that allow for the common carrier to engage in shipping, it could not deny the
remote vendor the benefit of having its goods delivered to its customers that it
enjoys as a result of using the common carrier-the remote vendor's benefit
is provided by the common carrier, not a state actor. If the state denied the one
common carrier access to the state's roads, the remote vendor could find
another.
Finally, the establishment of a legal infrastructure that allows for
transactions to occur is a benefit provided by state actors, but one that is
irrelevant to the remote vendor. If the remote vendor accepts orders-thereby
making sales-at its location, the transactions in question would occur outside
of the taxing state," 0 unlike the transaction for advertising services in the state
discussed above. Thus, there is no transaction involving the remote vendor for
which the state can provide the benefit of a legal infrastructure. This
conclusion admittedly may depend on where passage of title to the goods sold
occurs."' However, the sale is for property that originates outside of the taxing
state, so the state cannot provide sufficient benefits under the transactional
theory until at least the time when the property enters the state. If the state then
provides benefits that might reach the remote vendor for the goods in transit,
it might have enforcement jurisdiction over the vendor, but if the vendor is not
registered with the state and thus is denied access to the state's courts, 15 2 then
the state would not have provided the vendor with any benefit from the in-state
legal infrastructure and that infrastructure could not serve as the basis for the
state's enforcement jurisdiction over the vendor.
C. The Future ofEnforcement Jurisdiction:FederalAction

Given the above analysis, the states' current efforts to remove Quill's
physical presence rule for sales and use taxes and to adopt economic nexus
standards for other taxes will not grant the states enforcement jurisdiction over
all remote vendors making sales to their residents. Under the something-forwhich-it-can-ask-return aspect of the due process nexus inquiry, there is a set
Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.,
322 U.S. 327 (1944).
150. See J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. at 330.
151. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-401 (AM. LAW INST. & UNF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
152. See authorities cited supra note 79.
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of remote vendors over which the states do not have enforcement jurisdiction:
those whose only connection to a state is selling to residents of that state that
approach the vendors with orders. If history has any lesson here, it is that
people will model their practices in order to avoid a state's jurisdiction to tax
if possible and efficient for them.' Once the dominance of the Commerce
Clause limitations on enforcement jurisdiction is undermined, people should
be expected to change their behavior in response to the Due Process Clause
limitations. As the states' current issues with remote vendors demonstrate,
these limitations can have a serious economic impact. 154
The potential "jurisdictional misalignment"' arising from a state
having substantive jurisdiction over its residents' use of goods sold by a
remote vendor but not having enforcement jurisdiction as a practical matter
over the residents or as a legal matter over the remote vendor demonstrates the
need to redefine the relationship between the federal government and the states
with respect to state jurisdiction to tax if the states wish to fully solve their
remote vendor issues. As others have argued, limitations on state-level
enforcement jurisdiction may indicate the need to impose state tax collection
obligations at the federal level."' Understanding the something-for-which-itcan-ask-return aspect confirms the need to think beyond state-level
enforcement jurisdiction (barring a judicial refining of the due process
limitations on state jurisdiction to tax, which may itself be due 57

153. See Swain, supra note 100, at 373 ("[I]f tax rules allow us to structure
our affairs to achieve the same economic result at a lower tax cost, we generally will
do so.").
154. See authorities cited supranote 3.
155. See Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 43-45 (discussing jurisdictional
misalignment); Swain, supra note 93 (addressing the problem of "jurisdictional
misalignment," "a situation in which there is substantive jurisdiction to impose a tax
but no enforcement jurisdiction to compel a person to remit the tax.").
156. See Hartman, supra note 6, at 1025-26; Hellerstein, supra note 8, at
48-49; Hellerstein, Deconstructing, supra note 6, at 564; Swain, supra note 93, at
939-40 (addressing tax assignment solutions to jurisdictional misalignment).
157. Hellerstein, Electronic Commerce, supra note 6, at 482 ("There is

widespread recognition that traditional nexus criteria are ill-suited to the creation of
sensible and administrable rules for determining the taxability of taxpayers or
transactions in electronic commerce. Traditional tax jurisdiction or nexus principles,
after all, are rooted in concepts of territoriality, and the physical presence of the
taxpayer in the state.

. .

. [I]n any event, whether one is talking about traditional

concepts ofjurisdiction to tax based on physical presence or more 'modem' concepts
of jurisdiction to tax based on 'economic' presence, the fact remains that one is still,
in the end, counting contacts-be they tangible or intangible. But such an approach
makes little sense in cyberspace."); Swain, supra note 6, at 393 ("If the world has
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Though Congress has no authority to directly override the Due
Process Clause's limitations on enforcement jurisdiction,"ss a federal
obligation for remote vendors to collect taxes on the states' terms may offer a
complete solution to the states' current remote vendor issues. 19 The Due
Process Clause acts as a check on actions of the states, not the federal
government;16 0 however, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
does apply to the federal government and similar to that of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that "no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'"' The ultimate constitutionality of a
federal approach in this area is beyond the scope of this Article,162 but
changed, then state and local tax systems must change with it. For sales and use taxes,
this means jurisdiction to tax should be predicated on economic activity.").
158. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) ("Moreover,
while Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the States and thus
may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have
the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.") (internal citation
omitted); see also Edson, supra note 6, at 897 ("Conversely, Congress may not
regulate state taxes held unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. Therefore, a
thorough understanding of due process considerations underlying taxing jurisdiction
jurisprudence is of paramount importance as it is the only absolute bar to a state's
assertion of taxing jurisdiction."). But see Hellerstein, Deconstructing, supra note 6,
at 564 ("Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that Congress has power to consent
to violations of the Due Process Clause so long as they are not restraints by which
Congress itself is bound. Under this theory, Congress can authorize what would
otherwise be federalism-based violations of the Due Process Clause but not Due
Process violations of individual rights.") (internal citations omitted); Hellerstein,
Electronic Commerce, supra note 6, at 504-05 (noting that there are decent arguments
for Congress being able to authorize certain violations of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment where Congress has authority under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
159. See, e.g., Swain, supra note 93, at 931 (describing potential federal
solutions to a lack of state enforcement jurisdiction); Varian, supra note 121, at 646
(discussing clearinghouse option for collecting and distributing use taxes on sales by
remote vendors).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .") (emphasis added);
see also S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n.21
(1987).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
162. A D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision, considering a federal
obligation placed on vendors to collect taxes on cigarettes regardless of whether the
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assuming that the same nexus standards would apply to the federal government
for purposes of taxation as apply to the states, the federal government could
require any vendor that has a minimum connection with the United States and
receives benefits from the United States to comply with the tax laws of any
state in which it is a remote vendor (or a brick-and-mortar vendor for that
matter). 163 State fears of federal encroachment into issues of state taxation are
likely to lead to objections to a broad federal solution, 164 but a better
understanding of the due process limitations on enforcement jurisdiction
demonstrates that the states must give up the goal of subjecting all remote
vendors to their enforcement jurisdiction if they wish to shun federal
assistance.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Commerce Clause's days of dominating the field of state taxation
appear numbered. Certainly the Commerce Clause will remain important, but
with the demise of physical presence as the rule for enforcement jurisdiction,
the Due Process Clause is primed to take on a larger role in determining proper
vendors are present in the taxing state and discussing due process concerns, observed
that "[e]ven national legislation-which can permissibly sanction burdens on
interstate commerce-cannot violate the Due Process principles of 'fair play and
substantial justice.' Although Quill did not deal with excise taxes, there remains an
open question whether a national authorization of disparate state levies on e-commerce
renders concerns about presence and burden obsolete; Quill's analytical approach is
instructive." Gordon v. Holder, 632 F. 3d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal citations
omitted).
163. See Hartman, supra note 6, at 1026-27 (discussing the possibility of the
federal government acting under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
bypass the limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Hellerstein, Deconstructing,supra note 6, at 564 ("[A] strong case can be made that
Congress has power to consent to violations of the Due Process Clause so long as they
are not restraints by which Congress itself is bound. Under this theory, Congress can
authorize what would otherwise be federalism-based violations of the Due Process
Clause but not Due Process violations of individual rights.") (internal citations
omitted); Hellerstein, Electronic Commerce, supra note 6, at 504-05; see also Sicilian,
supra note 119, at 42 (discussing constitutionality of potential federal actions to
overcome due process limitations on the states).
164. See, e.g., Traci Gleason Wright & Jesse Rothstein, Taxes and the
Internet: Updating Tax Structuresfor a Wired World, 17 ST. TAX NOTES 491 (Aug.
23, 1999) ("States fear that if the federal government is given control over any sales
tax administration or funds, Congress will begin to appropriate it for its own purposes,
either by keeping some of the funds that pass through federal government hands or by
imposing conditions on their disbursement. States do not see federal allocations as
reliable enough to take the place of tax revenues under state control.").
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exercises of state jurisdiction to tax. An understanding of the something-forwhich-it-can-ask-return aspect of the due process nexus inquiry demonstrates
the need to elevate enforcement jurisdiction issues to the federal level to
accomplish complete solutions to those issues. In addition, many
commentators observe that the prongs of the Complete Auto test for whether a
state tax action satisfies the requirements of the Commerce Clause incorporate
Due Process Clause ideals as well, particularly the first and fourth prongs of
the test-whether the state has a substantial nexus with the person and whether
the tax is fairly related to services provided by the state.1 65 In the same way
that the minimum-connection aspect of the due process nexus inquiry may
inform the substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test if the physical
presence rule is abandoned, 16 6 a better understood something-for-which-itcan-ask-return aspect has the potential to revive the "dead" fourth prong. 167
The Commerce Clause might have more to demand of states attempting to
exercise enforcement jurisdiction over a person than just a substantial nexus
with the person. Thus, despite the states' best efforts, plenty of hurdles remain
for the states' attempts to bring remote vendors under their jurisdiction to tax.

165. See, e.g., Fatale, supra note 6, at 578.
166. See Thimmesch, supranote 100, at 188-91 (arguing that in a post-Quill
physical presence rule world, the Commerce Clause substantial nexus standard should
approach the Due Process Clause minimum connection standard).
167. See Dennen, supra note 104 ("The fourth prong has often been
considered to closely resemble the Due Process Clause regarding the state's ability to
take without giving value in return."); Giovannini & Hedstrom, supra note 104
(discussing the relationship between and current developments regarding the fourth
prong and the Due Process Clause).
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APPENDIX

The following chart summarizes the current state of Commerce Clause
and Due Process Clause limitations on enforcement jurisdiction and the
standards for their application. 16 8 The shaded box represents the area this
Article develops.
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Availment of
Economic Market
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168. The author is grateful to Arthur Rosen for the conceptualization of this
chart.

